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Abstract
The effects of ethnic geography, i.e., the distribution of ethnic groups across space,
on economic, political and social outcomes are not well understood. We develop
a novel index of ethnic segregation that takes both ethnic and spatial distances
between individuals into account. Importantly, we can decompose this index into
indices of spatial dispersion, generalized ethnic fractionalization, and the alignment
of spatial and ethnic distances. We use ethnographic maps, spatially disaggregated
population data, and language trees to compute these four indices for around 160
countries. We apply these indices to study the relation between ethnic geography
and current economic, political and social outcomes. We document that country
level quality of government, income and trust increase with the alignment compo-
nent of segregation, i.e., with the ratio between the country’s actual segregation
and the segregation it would have if ethnic groups were represented in each location
with population shares identical to their country-level population share. Hence, all
else equal, countries where ethnically diverse individuals live farther apart tend to
perform better.
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1 Introduction
There is a vast literature on how a country’s ethnic diversity affects economic, political and
social outcomes. This literature provides evidence for negative effects of ethnic diversity
on, e.g., peace, public goods provision, redistribution, the quality of government, and
economic development in general. In these studies, ethnic diversity is typically quantified
by indices based on the different ethnic groups’ country-wide population shares.1 By
definition, these indices ignore ethnic geography, i.e., the distribution of ethnic groups
across space.
Ethnic geography may however play an important role. Consider first a country that is
ethnically diverse in all locations. The spatial proximity of ethnically diverse individuals
could be a cause of friction and mutual distrust, making cooperation at the local level hard
to achieve and possibly leading to dysfunctional communities and local governments.2 As
a result of weak social cohesion and poor governance in most locations, this country might
well end up with poor governance and poor economic performance at the national level.
Alternatively, consider a country that is equally ethnically diverse (based on the dif-
ferent ethnic group’s country-level population shares), but in which all locations are eth-
nically homogeneous, as the different ethnic groups are separated from one another. In
this country, individual communities may be more functional and local governance better.
However, at the country level, divisions may be larger and a sense of community harder
to achieve, among other things, because the less cumbersome cooperation and preference
aggregation at the local level may make it easier for ethnic groups to recruit resources to
fight (peacefully or violently) for their own interests at the national level.
These two hypothetical countries suggest that the effects of ethnic geography on gov-
ernance at the national level are unclear from a theoretical perspective. The notion that
the second (more segregated) country would be worse-off at the national level is consistent
with the findings of Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), who make an important first step
towards taking ethnic geography into account. They construct an index of ethnic segrega-
tion that is based on the various ethnic groups’ population shares in different subnational
units such as regions or provinces. Using this index, which depends on ethnic geography
as well as “internal administrative borders which, in turn, are at a government’s discre-
tion” (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011, p. 1889), they find that the quality of government
is lower in more ethnically segregated countries.
1Prominent examples are the index of ethnic fractionalization (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina
et al. 2003, Desmet et al. 2012) and the indices of ethnic polarization (e.g., Esteban and Ray 1994,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a review of the early literature
on ethnic diversity and economic performance.
2Studies exploiting within-country variation indeed show that higher local ethnic diversity goes hand-
in-hand with lower local public goods provision, less trust, less social capital, less cooperation, weaker
social norms, and weaker social sanctioning (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, 2002, Miguel and Gugerty
2005, Algan et al. 2016, Gershman and Rivera 2017).
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We contribute to the literature on ethnic diversity by proposing a set of indices that
capture important aspects of ethnic geography. Our first contribution is a methodological
one: we derive a new segregation index that is based on both spatial and ethnic distances
between pairs of individuals. There is indeed evidence that both these distances matter
(see, e.g., White, 1983, for spatial distances and Desmet et al., 2009, for ethnolinguistic
distances). To develop our index, we consider a society divided into ethnic or, more
generally, social groups and scattered over a territory. The starting point is a general
class of indices that are expressions of the relation between a randomly selected pair of
individuals. The basic idea is that the relation of two individuals depends on whether
they are (i) unlikely to interact personally due to high spatial distance and (ii) unlikely to
share a common ethnocultural background due to high ethnic distance. We then uniquely
characterize an index from this class via a set of axioms that are intuitive properties of a
segregation measure. These axioms capture the notions that segregation is higher when
individuals in the same locations are more ethnically homogeneous and when ethnically
diverse individuals are located farther apart from one another. Our segregation index can
be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected individuals neither interact
personally, nor share a common ethnocultural background.3
This index has two prominent features. To understand the first, we make use of the
terminology used by Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004). They call segregation measures “a-
spatial” if they are based on population shares in administrative units, and “spatial” if
they are based on spatial distances between individuals.4 Our index is a spatial segrega-
tion measure. It thereby avoids standard problems of a-spatial segregation measures, in
particular the border dependence mentioned by Alesina and Zhuaravskya (2011) and the
checkerboard problem (White 1983, Reardon and O’Sullivan 2004).5 Second, our index
can be decomposed into three (sub-)indices: an index of spatial dispersion, a well-known
index of generalized ethnic fractionalization (see below), and a measure of the alignment
of spatial and ethnic distances between individuals (i.e., ethno-spatial alignment or, sim-
ply, alignment hereinafter). Figure 1 illustrates these components and the corresponding
properties of our segregation index.
Figure 1 about here
First consider part (a) of this figure, where only the easternmost and the westernmost
location are inhabited in the left diagram, and only the two more central locations in the
3Such probabilistic interpretation simply requires that ethnic and spatial distances are normalized to
take values in the unit interval.
4Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) and Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) review a-spatial and spatial
segregation measures, respectively.
5There are at least two reasons why overcoming border dependence is important: First, administrative
borders are the result of policy choices that may be endogenous to ethnic geography. Second, border-
dependent segregation measures can lead to different rankings of ethnic segregation across countries
depending on the administrative units used (e.g., provinces/states versus districts). Online Appendix A
illustrates border dependence and the checkerboard problem of a-spatial segregation indices.
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right diagram. Our index suggests that the society in the right diagram is less segregated
than the society in the left diagram because the spatial distance between individuals
from ethnically distinct groups (represented by different tones of gray) is lower, all else
being equal. This feature is captured by the spatial dispersion component of our seg-
regation index. In part (b) our index suggests that the society in the right diagram is
less segregated than the society in the left diagram, because of the lower ethnic distance
between individuals in different locations (represented by more similar tones of gray), all
else being equal. This is captured by the generalized ethnic fractionalization component.
Part (c) illustrates the important role that ethno-spatial alignment plays in our concep-
tualization. On average, ethnic and spatial distances are identical in the societies in the
left and the right diagrams. However, in the society in the left diagram ethno-spatial
alignment is high, as individuals that are ethnically most distant are also located furthest
apart compared to the benchmark where each ethnicity is proportionally represented in
each location. Ethno-spatial alignment is lower in the society in the right diagram, where
ethnically distant individuals live spatially closer to one another while spatially distant
individuals are ethnically closer.
Our second contribution is applied in nature. We compute these four indices of ethnic
geography for 161 countries from all over the world.6 We define as ethnic groups the
language groups listed in the Ethnologue (Gordon, 2005). To measure ethnolinguistic
distances, we rely on the Ethnologue’s language trees. To measure spatial distances, we
use the World Language Mapping System’s (WLMS) map that represents the traditional
homeland of each language group listed in the Ethnologue.7 To measure local population,
we use population density maps from CIESIN (2019). In addition, we construct a simple
map based on global land cover data that should proxy for the exogenous component of
the spatial distribution of a country’s population.
We use our indices in cross-country regressions to improve our understanding of the role
that ethnic geography plays in economic, political and social outcomes around the globe.
Our indices are well suited to this purpose thanks to the various precautions we took in
designing and computing them. First, they are based on spatial distances rather than
administrative borders. They are therefore not driven by the drawing of administrative
borders, which is a policy choice that may be endogenous to ethnic geography. Second, we
have computed these indices for many countries, so that we have a sample with almost full
global coverage. Third, the reliance on a map of the traditional homelands of language
groups goes some way in ensuring that our the indices are not driven by recent (voluntary
6We do not compute our indices for small countries with a current population of less than 250,000 or
a land surface area of less than 5,000 km2.
7The WMLS aims at representing “the region within each country, which is the traditional homeland
of each indigenous language” (WMLS, version 19, n.p.). There is one caveat. In some former colonies
where many Europeans settled, native groups got largely displaced and the WLMS map shows the new
territories of these language groups as their traditional homelands. We discuss and address this caveat
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, where we exclude 26 former settler colonies in some robustness tests.
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or forced) migration and urbanization, in particular when combining this map with the
soil-suitability-based proxy for the spatial distribution of the population.
We first focus on the associations between our index of ethnic segregation on the one
hand, and the quality of government, incomes and generalized trust on the other hand.
We find a negative relation between ethnic segregation and the quality of government,
similar to Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) with their index of a-spatial segregation in
their sample of 97 countries. We further find that our index of ethnic segregation tends
to be negatively associated with incomes too, but unrelated to generalized trust.
More importantly, we study the relation between the three components of our index
of ethnic segregation – ethnic fractionalization, spatial dispersion and ethno-spatial align-
ment – and these outcome variables. Ethnic fractionalization tends to be associated with
lower-quality government and lower incomes. This association is not overly robust when
controlling for some biological, climatic and geographical variables that may shape ethnic
diversity and ethnic geography. It is nonetheless the main reason for the negative relation
between our index of ethnic segregation on the one hand, and the quality of government
and incomes on the other hand. Spatial dispersion is basically unrelated to all of our
outcome variables. Most strikingly, we find a positive and statistically significant associ-
ation between the alignment of ethnic and spatial distances between individuals, and the
quality of government, incomes and trust. Hence, conditionally on ethnic fractionalization
and spatial dispersion, societies in which ethnically diverse people live far apart are, on
average, better governed, richer and more trusting. Such conditionality is what differen-
tiates the analysis of segregation from the analysis of alignment: higher alignment does
not indicate higher segregation (relative to another country), but a level of segregation
higher than what the country would have had, had all ethnic groups been represented in
all locations with population shares identical to their country shares. Unlike in Figure
1(c), such “benchmark” segregation does vary across countries and we thus control for it.
Our work is related to other contributions on the measurement of segregation that
incorporate the spatial dimension. Several contributions introduce spatial distances into
well-known a-spatial models of segregation (e.g., Jakubs 1981 for the dissimilarity index;
White 1983 for the isolation index; or Reardon and O’Sullivan 2004 for the dissimilarity
index, the Theil index and the interaction index). Moreover, Echenique and Fryer Jr
(2007) develop a segregation index based on proximity in networks.8 To our knowledge,
there is, however, no other segregation measure that presents both ethnic/social and
spatial distances in the same framework.9
8In their model spatial distances are binary, but the degree of isolation of an individual depends on
the isolation of every other individual in the network. Blumenstock and Fratamico (2013) also rely on
network data for providing a-spatial segregation measures.
9Methodologically, our approach is in the tradition of exposure measurement, being loosely based
on the isolation-interaction models of Bell (1954), White (1983), and Philipson (1993). Most axiomatic
work on segregation focuses on another class of models, known as evenness indices (e.g., Hutchens 2004,
Chakravarty and Silber 2007, and Frankel and Volij 2011). While some evenness measures are extended
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Our framework is also related to prominent models of fractionalization and polarization
(e.g., Esteban and Ray 1994, Duclos et al. 2004, Bossert et al. 2011), as we introduce
ethnic/social distances in the very same way they do. In particular, the generalized ethnic
fractionalization component of our ethnic segregation index coincides with the generalized
fractionalization index introduced by Greenberg (1956) and later axiomatized by Bossert
et al. (2011), which in turn is equivalent to the standard fractionalization index when
ethnic distances are binary.10
As mentioned earlier, our paper is related to the extensive literature on the relation
between ethnic diversity and economic, political and social outcomes. We contribute to
this literature by developing, computing and applying our spatial index of ethnic segre-
gation and its three sub-indices – all with global coverage. There are two complementary
strands of the literature that also rely on ethnographic maps to study the role of ethnic
geography. The first of these strands chooses subnational ethnographic regions as units of
analysis. Prominent examples include studies on the relation between the location of eth-
nic groups and conflict (e.g., Cederman et al. 2009, Weidmann 2009, Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou 2016, Ko¨nig et al. 2017), on the effect of pre-colonial and current institutions
on development (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, 2014), and on ethnic favoritism
(De Luca et al. 2018). These contributions provide interesting insights into the effect
of ethnic geography on within-country variation while our segregation index allows for
comparing ethnic geography across countries and understanding the country-level effects
of ethnic geography.
Just as we do, contributions to the second strand combine ethnographic maps with
population density maps to construct country-level measures of ethnic diversity and ethnic
geography. Matuszeki and Schneider (2006) compute a measure of average subnational
ethnic fractionalization, and study how this measure relates to conflict at the country
level. Desmet et al. (2016) develop a measure that captures the average exposure of
an individual to members of the country’s different ethnic groups with an emphasis on
weighting this exposure according to the representation of these groups at the individual’s
location. They study how this measure relates to public goods provision. There are two
main differences between these approaches and ours: First, we focus on conceptualizing
ethnic segregation and introducing the novel concept of ethno-spatial alignment, while
they extend the fractionalization framework. Matuszeki and Schneider (2006) do so in
a straightforward way, and Desmet et al. (2016) by introducing population weights in a
non-linear fashion. Second, spatial (and ethnic) distances are continuous in our approach,
to introduce spatial distances, they do not lend themselves naturally to the introduction of both spatial
and ethnic distances.
10From a purely mathematical view point, the generalized fractionalization index axiomatized in Bossert
et al. (2011) is an unnormalized Gini index. Analogously, our segregation index can be seen as a particular
type of multivariate Gini index (see, e.g., Gajdos and Weymark 2005). However, as it violates standard
majorization criteria of multivariate inequality measurement, it should not be interpreted as an inequality
measure.
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but binary in Matuszeki and Schneider (2006) and Desmet et al. (2016). We thus see our
spatial segregation index as complementary to their measures, which capture alternative
important aspects of ethnic diversity and ethnic geography.11
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, derives our segregation index, and es-
tablishes its decomposability into indices of generalized ethnic fractionalization, spatial
dispersion, and ethno-spatial alignment. Section 3 first explains the data and the method-
ology used to construct our four indices of ethnic geography. It then offers a first look at
these indices and presents our cross-country evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2 Development of indices of ethnic geography
2.1 General model
A population is partitioned into n ethnic or, more generally, social groups G := {1, . . . , n}
and distributed over t locations on a territory T := {1, . . . , t}. We generally assume
t ≥ n ≥ 3 so that (i) there is significant ethnic heterogeneity; (ii) there are at least as
many locations as groups, so that it is possible that no individuals of different groups
share the same location.
Denote by µgp ∈ [0, 1] the share of population that corresponds to group g ∈ G in
location p ∈ T . Let µp :=
∑
g∈G µ
g
p and µ
g :=
∑
p∈T µ
g
p be the total population shares of
location p ∈ T and group g ∈ G respectively, where ∑p∈T µp = ∑g∈G µg = 1. Then, the
n× t matrix of population shares
µ :=

µ11 · · · µ1t
...
. . .
...
µn1 · · · µnt

defines a mass distribution, and the space of all mass distributions M is the subset of
[0, 1]t×n such that the restrictions above are satisfied. For any pair of locations p, q ∈ T ,
let λp,q ∈ [0, 1] be the spatial distance between them, where we generally assume λp,q = 0
if p = q and λp,q = λq,p. A spatial distribution is defined by the t × t matrix of spatial
11Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2016) use ethnographic maps to look at ethnic geography by computing
ethnic fractionalization in grid cells of different sizes. Alesina et al. (2016) and Guariso and Rogall (2016)
use ethnographic maps to measure inequality across ethnic groups and to study the country-level effects
of between-group inequality on economic development and conflict, respectively. Due to the focus of these
studies, they take neither the spatial distances between individuals from different ethnic homelands nor
the linguistic distances between individuals from different ethnic groups into account.
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distances between all pairs of locations
λ :=

λ1,1 · · · λ1,t
...
. . .
...
λt,1 · · · λt,t
 ,
and the space of all spatial distributions L is the subset of [0, 1]t×t such that the restrictions
above are satisfied. For any pair of groups g, h ∈ G, let γg,h ∈ [0, 1] be the ethnic distance
between them, where we generally assume γg,h = 0 if g = h and γg,h = γh,g. The n × n
matrix of ethnic distances between all pairs of groups
γ :=

γ1,1 · · · γ1,n
...
. . .
...
γn,1 · · · γn,n

defines an ethnic distribution, and the space of all ethnic distributions G is the sub-
set of [0, 1]n×n such that the restrictions above are satisfied. Finally, a joint distribu-
tion is a triple of mass, spatial and ethnic distributions, and an index is a function
S : ([0, 1]t×n, [0, 1]t×t, [0, 1]n×n) → R+, where S(µ, λ, γ) quantifies some property of the
joint distribution (µ, λ, γ) ∈ (M,L,G).
To give meaning to our framework we now impose some more structure. We assume
(a relevant feature of) the relation between each pair of individuals is determined by the
distances between their groups and locations.12 For each pair of individuals that inhabit
locations p, q ∈ T and belong to groups g, h ∈ G, we quantify the relation between them
by pi(λp,q, γ
g,h), where the function pi : [0, 1]2 → R+ is continuous and non-decreasing
in each argument and satisfies pi(0, 0) = 0. Among the various interpretations of the
function pi, one possibility is to see it as the degree of alienation (i.e., lack of common
interests) between a pair of individuals, which naturally increases with their spatial and
ethnic distances. Given this, we consider the class of indices that are expression of the
relation between a randomly selected pair of individuals, taking the form
S(µ, λ, γ) =
∑
(p,q)∈T 2
∑
(g,h)∈G2
µgpµ
h
qpi(λp,q, γ
g,h) (1)
for each joint distribution (µ, λ, γ) ∈ (M,L,G) and any function pi that satisfies the above
restrictions.
In the next section we will introduce a set of axioms that pin down a particular in-
dex (up to positive scalar multiplication) from class (1) as our segregation index. This
coincides with identifying a specific function pi that is suitable for the measurement of
12For related approaches, see Esteban and Ray (1994), Duclos et al. (2004), and Bossert et al. (2011).
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segregation. As our initial restrictions on pi are weak (pi can be, e.g., logarithmic, expo-
nential, multiplicative, additive, etc.), class (1) is vast. Nevertheless, the focus on class (1)
considerably narrows the set of indices under consideration by taking pairs of individuals
as the relevant unit of analysis and by imposing that any pair’s contribution to segrega-
tion depends on their spatial and ethnic distances only.13 We are not concerned by these
restrictions for three reasons intimately related to the interpretability/decomposability of
the index and the crucial issues of border dependence and data availability in applications:
1. We think of segregation as a measure of the extent to which ethnically diverse indi-
viduals are located far apart, which captures the notion that society becomes more
segregated when the interaction between ethnically diverse individuals becomes less
likely. This allows for an intuitive interpretation of our segregation measure in
terms of probabilistic interaction and a meaningful decomposition into well-known
concepts such as ethnic fractionalization and spatial dispersion (see Section 2.3).
2. We deliberately take spatial (and ethnic) distances as primitives of the model in or-
der to build a segregation measure that is independent of borders between locations
(and ethnic groups) that are arbitrarily drawn to achieve a discrete categorization.
The focus on distances rather than individual attributes is in line with our empirical
application where ethnic distances are not derived as differences between cardinal
attributes of ethnic groups but rather as a function of the number of nodes that
their languages share on a linguistic tree (see Section 3.1).
3. As our unit of analysis is the pair of individuals and we want to focus on their eth-
nic/spatial distances, function pi could only be generalized by making it dependent
on some elements of the mass distribution µ. However, by introducing some element
of µ in function pi, we would implicitly assume that the relation between two indi-
viduals is discontinuous at some borders between locations (or ethnic groups) and
any generalization of pi would therefore (re-)introduce border dependence “through
the back door.”14
13To see this, one can rewrite form (1) as a function of distances between pairs of individuals rather
than between pairs of groups and locations. With some abuse of notation, let λi,j and γ
i,j denote the
spatial and ethnic distances between each pair of individuals i, j from a finite population P . Then,
S = (1/|P |2)∑(i,j)∈P 2 pi(λi,j , γi,j).
14As pointed out in Footnote 13, class (1) can be written as a function of spatial and ethnic distances
between pairs of individuals. In applications, categorizing individuals in a limited number of locations
and ethnicities (i.e., introducing arbitrary borders) is a necessary approximation. Ideally, this should not
lead to systematic biases in the computation of the index. While these biases are minimal for class (1)
as they tend to “average out” due to the linearity in each element of µ, they would be magnified if we
had some element of µ in function pi due to the non-linearity.
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2.2 Axiomatization of the segregation index
We now introduce a set of axioms that are desirable properties of a segregation measure.
For simplicity of exposition, these desirable properties are defined through simple exam-
ples of distributions with two or three mass points. The first two axioms consider pairs of
groups and locations, thereby focusing on obtaining ethnic homogeneity within a location.
In particular, segregation should increase when the population becomes ethnically homo-
geneous in all locations, so that there is no local interaction between ethnically diverse
individuals. Axiom 1 formalizes this property and, in addition, requires it to hold when
the ethnic distance between groups is reduced by an arbitrarily small amount.
Axiom 1 (Local ethnic homogeneity and ethnic distances) Data: Consider a joint
distribution (µ, λ, γ) ∈ (M,L,G) with two locations p, q ∈ T and two groups g, h ∈ G
such that
µgp = µ
h
p = µ
h
q = 1/3 with λp,q > 0 and γ
g,h > 0,
and let µ˜ ∈M, γ˜ ∈ G and  > 0 satisfy
µ˜gp = µ
g
p and µ˜
h
q = µ
h
p + µ
h
q with γ˜
g,h = γg,h − .
Statement: We require S(µ, λ, γ) < S(µ˜, λ, γ˜) for  arbitrarily small.
Let us discuss Axiom 1, whose distributions are depicted in Figure 2(a). There are
two locations (left and right) and two ethnic groups (represented by dark and light tones
of gray). Initially, in distribution (µ, λ, γ), two-thirds of the population are in the left
location, whose ethnic composition is perfectly balanced (half dark, half light), while
the remaining one-third of the population is in the right location and is homogeneously
dark. Given this, we transfer all individuals of the dark group into the right location,
so that the left location becomes homogeneously light while the right location remains
homogeneously dark. Moreover, we reduce the ethnic distance between the light and the
dark group by an arbitrarily small amount  (represented by the slightly lighter tone of
gray of the dark group in the right diagram). Axiom 1 requires segregation to increase as
a consequence of this transformation. Intuitively, the axiom considers a trade off between
ethnic homogeneity within locations and the ethnic distance across groups, requiring the
former to dominate the trade off when the reduction in ethnic distance is arbitrarily small.
Figure 2 about here
Axiom 2 is very similar to Axiom 1. It is based on the same initial distribution and
the same transfer of population from the left to the right location. The only difference is
that, instead of reducing the ethnic distance between the light and the dark groups, we
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reduce the spatial distance between the left and right locations by an arbitrarily small
amount.
Axiom 2 (Local ethnic homogeneity and spatial distances) Data: Consider a joint
distribution (µ, λ, γ) ∈ (M,L,G) with two locations p, q ∈ T and two groups g, h ∈ G
such that
µgp = µ
h
p = µ
h
q = 1/3 with λp,q > 0 and γ
g,h > 0.
and let µ˜ ∈M, λ˜ ∈ L and  > 0 satisfy
µ˜gp = µ
g
p and µ˜
h
q = µ
h
p + µ
h
q with λ˜p,q = λp,q − .
Statement: We require S(µ, λ, γ) < S(µ˜, λ˜, γ) for  arbitrarily small.
These distributions are depicted in Figure 2(b). Intuitively, this axiom considers
a trade off between ethnic homogeneity within locations and the spatial distance across
locations, requiring the former to dominate the trade off when the reduction in the spatial
distance is arbitrarily small.
The next two axioms are still inspired by the generally desirable property that seg-
regation should increase whenever the interaction between ethnically diverse individuals
becomes less likely. However, unlike Axioms 1 and 2, they consider triples of groups
and locations, thereby focusing on changes in distributions that foster the alignment of
spatial and ethnic distances across pairs of individuals. The basic idea is that, to obtain
higher segregation, closely located pairs of individuals should be ethnically closer, while
ethnically distant pairs should be spatially further apart. Axioms 3 and 4 formalize this
idea.
Axiom 3 (Alignment of ethnic distances) Data: Consider any joint distribution
(µ, λ, γ) ∈ (M,L,G) with three locations p, q, r ∈ T and three groups g, h, i ∈ G such
that
µgp = µ
h
q = µ
i
r = 1/3,
λp,q > λq,r > 0 and λp,r = λp,q + λq,r,
γg,h = γh,i = γg,i/2 > 0,
and let γ˜ ∈ G and  > 0 satisfy
γ˜g,i = γg,i, γ˜g,h = γg,h + , γ˜h,i = γh,i − .
Statement: We require S(µ, λ, γ) < S(µ, λ, γ˜) for all  ∈ (0, γh,i).
Let us discuss Axiom 3, whose distributions are depicted in Figure 2(c). The popu-
lation mass is uniformly distributed on three locations (left, central and right) and three
11
ethnic groups (represented by dark, medium and light tones of gray), where the left lo-
cation is homogeneously light, the central location is homogeneously medium and the
right location is homogeneously dark. The three locations are on a line, where the central
location is closer to the right than to the left. Regarding ethnic distances, the medium
group is halfway between the other two groups in the left diagram representing distribu-
tion (µ, λ, γ). Axiom 3 requires segregation to increase when we change ethnic distances
so that the medium group becomes ethnically closer to the dark group (represented by
the darker tone of gray of the middle location in the right diagram). This is intuitive: as
the medium group already inhabits a location that is spatially closer to the location of
the dark group than to the location of the light group, the interaction between ethnically
diverse individuals becomes less likely.
Axiom 4 (Alignment of spatial distances) Data: Consider any joint distribution
(µ, λ, γ) ∈ (M,L,G) with three locations p, q, r ∈ T and three groups g, h, i ∈ G such
that
µgp = µ
h
q = µ
i
r = 1/3,
λp,q = λq,r = λp,r/2 > 0,
γg,h > γh,i > 0 and γg,i = γg,h + γh,i,
and let λ˜ ∈ L and  > 0 satisfy
λ˜p,r = λp,r, λ˜p,q = λp,q + , λ˜q,r = λq,r − .
Statement: We require S(µ, λ, γ) < S(µ, λ˜, γ) for all  ∈ (0, λq,r).
Figure 2(d) represents Axiom 4 graphically. Again, there are three locations respec-
tively inhabited by three equally sized ethnic groups. The medium group is ethnically
closer to the dark group than to the light, while the central location is halfway between
the right and the left location. Axiom 4 requires segregation to increase if the central
location is moved closer to the right location. Similarly to the previous axiom, the intu-
ition is that as the spatial distance between ethnically diverse individuals increases, their
interaction becomes less likely.
Our four axioms identify our segregation index from the class of measures (1):15
Theorem 1 An index from class (1) satisfies Axioms 1-4 if and only if it takes the form
S(µ, λ, γ) =
∑
(p,q)∈T 2
∑
(g,h)∈G2
µgpµ
h
qλp,qγ
g,h, (2)
up to a positive scalar multiplication.
15The proof of Theorem is 1 in the Appendix.
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This theorem implies that our segregation index always provides unambiguous rankings
of joint distributions (µ, λ, γ) ∈ (M,L,G). Further, it implies that ethnic and spa-
tial distances are complementary forces in the determination of the relation of a pair of
individuals, so that segregation is high only if pairs of individuals that are ethnically
heterogeneous are systematically located apart from each other.
For any λp,q ∈ [0, 1] and γg,h ∈ [0, 1], the function pi(λp,q, γg,h) = λp,qγg,h always
takes value in [0, 1]. It can thus be interpreted probabilistically. Intuitively, the relation
between two individuals depends on (i) whether they do not interact personally and (ii)
whether they do not share a common ethnocultural background. Given this, it is natural
to interpret the function pi as the probability that both these events are realized, where
the spatial distance λp,q is the probability of event (i) and the ethnic distance γ
g,h is the
probability of event (ii). Then, our segregation index S represents the probability that
two randomly selected individuals neither interact personally nor share an ethnocultural
background.
2.3 Decomposition of the segregation index
By construction, our segregation index is strongly related to the fractionalization litera-
ture. Letting 1t be the spatial distribution where the spatial distance between each pair
of locations is equal to 1 (so that space “does not matter”),16 it is easy to show that our
index is equivalent to the generalized fractionalization index by Bossert et al. (2011),
F (µ, γ) := S(µ,1t, γ) =
∑
(g,h)∈G2
µgµhγg,h. (3)
This generalized fractionalization index represents the average ethnic distance between
pairs of individuals, and can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected
individuals do not share a common ethnocultural background. If we also impose ethnic
distances to take value in {0, 1}, our index reduces to the standard fractionalization index,
which has been widely applied to measure ethnic fractionalization based on categorical
data (see, e.g., Alesina et al. 2004 and references therein).17
Applying the same reasoning to the other dimension, and letting 1n be the ethnic
distribution where the distance between each pair of groups is 1 (so that ethnicity “does
not matter”),18 we can define the spatial dispersion index as
D(µ, λ) := S(µ, λ,1n) =
∑
(p,q)∈T 2
µpµqλp,q. (4)
16As the spatial distance between a location and itself is also equal to 1, it follows that 1t /∈ L.
17To see this, let 10n ∈ G be the ethnic distribution where γg,h = 1 if h 6= g and γg,g = 0 for each g ∈ G,
so that F (µ,10n) = S(µ,1t,1
0
n) = 1 −
∑
g∈G (µ
g)
2
. This is the standard fractionalization index, which
indicates the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different ethnic groups.
18As the ethnic the distance between a group and itself is also equal to 1, it follows that 1n /∈ G.
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This index measures the average spatial distance between pairs of individuals and can
be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected individuals will not interact
personally.
Our segregation index tends to be high if spatial distances between locations and
ethnic distances between groups are high, i.e., when F and D are high. Moreover, it
also depends on the alignment between spatial and ethnic distances, i.e., on whether
a high spatial distance between two individuals tends to go hand-in-hand with a high
ethnic distance between them. For each µ ∈ M, denote by µ ∈ M the benchmark mass
distribution corresponding to µ, where (i) groups and locations have the same mass as in
µ, i.e., µg = µg and µp = µp for all g ∈ G and p ∈ T ; and (ii) groups are proportionally
represented at each location, i.e., µgp/µp = µ
g for all g ∈ G and p ∈ T . Accordingly,
we refer to S(µ, λ, γ) as the benchmark segregation of S(µ, λ, γ), and we propose as a
measure of ethno-spatial alignment
A(µ, λ, γ) :=
{
S(µ, λ, γ)/S(µ, λ, γ) if S(µ, λ, γ) > 0,
1 if S(µ, λ, γ) = 0.
(5)
Given our probabilistic interpretation of S, A can be seen as a likelihood ratio: it is the
probability that two randomly selected individuals do not interact personally and do not
share an ethnocultural background given mass distribution µ, relative to the probability of
the same event given the corresponding benchmark mass distribution µ, which is identical
to µ except that ethnic groups are represented at each location proportionally to their
aggregate shares. Intuitively, focusing on the likelihood ratio should “neutralize” the mag-
nitude effects of average spatial and ethnic distances. In fact, A(µ, kλ, k′γ) = A(µ, λ, γ)
for all k, k′ > 0, while S(µ, kλ, k′γ) = kk′S(µ, λ, γ) for all k, k′ > 0. Hence, our measure
of alignment satisfies scale invariance with respect to both spatial and ethnic distances,
while our segregation index does not. Other properties of our measure of alignment di-
rectly follow from the axioms in the previous section, which are all satisfied in the sense
that alignment increases whenever segregation increases.
Lastly, we show how the various measures are related to one other:19
Proposition 1 It holds that
S(µ, λ, γ) =
{
F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ)A(µ, λ, γ) if F (µ, γ) > 0 and D(µ, λ) > 0,
0 if F (µ, γ) = 0 or D(µ, λ) = 0.
(6)
This proposition shows that our segregation index S can be decomposed into the gener-
alized ethnic fractionalization index F , the spatial dispersion index D, and the alignment
19The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix.
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index A in a multiplicative fashion.20 Moreover, Proposition 1 and equation (5) imply
S(µ, λ, γ) = F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ).
That is, benchmark segregation is equal to the product of generalized ethnic fractional-
ization and spatial dispersion.
3 Application
3.1 Data and computation of our indices of ethnic geography
We aim at computing our indices of ethnic geography, i.e., the segregation index and
its three components, for a large and diverse set of countries from all over the world.
For these countries, we need information on locations and ethnic groups, so that we can
then derive mass distribution µ, spatial distribution λ, and ethnic distribution γ. These
distributions are the inputs required for the computation of our indices.
We therefore combine two data sources. First, we use the Ethnologue (Gordon, 2005),
which provides a comprehensive list of the world’s known living languages. We consider
the language groups listed in the Ethnologue as ethnic groups. It is important to remember
that language is more than just a communication device. Common language often implies
common ancestry, homeland, cultural heritage, norms, and values.21 The advantages in
relying on the Ethnologue for classifying ethnic groups are fourfold: First, the Ethnologue
provides a comprehensive rather than a selective list of ethnolinguistic groups. Second,
the Ethnologue provides linguistic trees for the different language families which show the
historical relation between all languages. These linguistic trees are thus helpful in mea-
suring linguistic distances between ethnic groups. Third, the World Language Mapping
System (WLMS, version 19) provides a map representing the homelands of the language
groups in the Ethnologue. This map allows measuring spatial distances between locations
inhabited by different groups. Last, but not least, this map represents “the region within
each country, which is the traditional homeland of each indigenous language” (WLMS,
version 19, n.p.), while populations living away from their traditional homelands, e.g.,
migrations to cities and refugees, are not mapped.22
The second data source is the population density map from the Gridded Population
20We discuss in Online Appendix B how this decomposition relates to the interpretation of our seg-
regation index as a geometric projection and to a decomposition of S based on the Euclidean norms of
vectors of spatial and ethnic distances.
21Desmet et al. (2017) find that ethnic identity is an important determinant of responses to many
questions on cultural norms, values and preferences in the World Value Surveys.
22There is, however, one caveat. In some former colonies where many Europeans settled, native groups
were largely displaced and the WLMS map shows the new territories of these language groups as their
traditional homelands. We discuss and address this caveat in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, where we exclude 26
former settler colonies in some robustness tests.
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of the World (GPW, version 4), which is based on population census tables and admin-
istrative boundaries, and provided by CIESIN (2016). For some robustness tests, we use
an alternative map that should proxy for the exogenous spatial distribution of a country’s
population shaped just by biological, climatic and geographical forces. This map is based
on geo-coded information on global land cover from the U.S. Geological Survey (2000)
and the assumption that a country’s population is equally distributed across its entire
area potentially suitable for agriculture.23
We take as ethnic groups in each country all the language groups with more than 100
native speakers listed in the Ethnologue and with a homeland mapped within this country.
The median and average number of ethnic groups per country are 9 and 41, respectively.
There is however a lot of variability in the number of groups: Some countries (15 out of
161 in our sample) have only one ethnic group, while Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and
Nigeria have 767, 640 and 450 ethnic groups, respectively.
To determine locations, we use grid cells of 0.5 × 0.5 arc minutes (corresponding to
around 9×9 km near the equator) and cut them at country borders and at the boundaries
between different ethnic homelands. We thereby get “proper” squared cells as well as
smaller “squiggly” cells (due to country borders or ethnic homeland boundaries). We
take each of these (proper or squiggly) cells as a location.
To determine the mass distribution µ, we rely on the population density map from
GPW (or the land-cover-based alternative described above). Let m, mp and m
g
p denote
the total population of a country, the population in cell p and the population of language
group g in cell p, respectively. For cells p that are part of a homeland of a single language
group g, it is straightforward that mgp = mp, where mp is given by GPW. The WMLS
map suggests that most homelands have only one language group, but other homelands
contain more than one and up to seven language groups. We find that 90 percent of our
proper and squiggly cells belong to the homeland of a single group. The remaining 10
percent of our cells belong to ethnic homelands of multiple ethnic groups. Let np denote
the number of ethnic groups whose ethnic homeland includes cell p. We find that for 9
percent of cells np = 2, while np > 2 for 1 percent of cells. For these groups and cells,
we simply assume mgp =
mp
np
, where mp is given by GPW and np by WMLS.
24 We then
compute population shares as µgp =
mgp
m
, where m =
∑
p∈T mp.
Figure 3 illustrates the ethnic homelands and the grid cells for Togo (left) and Benin
(right). Moreover, it indicates the population in each proper and squiggly cell. We will
23The map used is the “Global Land Cover Characteristics Data Base Version 2.0,” which classifies land
in 18 categories. We classify all areas as potentially suitable for agriculture except deserts, semi-deserts,
glaciers, and tundra.
24This simple rule may lead us to overestimate the local population of very small language groups,
which is the main reason for dropping languages spoken by no more than 100 individuals.
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come back to this figure soon.
Add Figure 3 around here
To derive the spatial distribution λ, we use ArcGIS to determine the centroid of each
(proper or squiggly) cell p. We then use the latitude and the longitude of these centroids
to compute the geodesic distance between any two cells p and q of any given country. We
normalize these geodesic distances by the average geodesic distance across all cell-pairs
of this country. We use the resulting relative spatial distances λp,q in the computation of
our indices.25
To derive the ethnic distribution γ, we rely on the Ethnologue’s linguistic trees for
the different language families. Linguistic trees characterize each language by a series of
nodes and thereby contain information about the evolution of languages and the historical
relation between ethnolinguistic groups. Two languages share no common node if they
belong to different language families, e.g., the Indo-European and the Uralic language fam-
ily. Such coarse divisions suggest that the language groups separated early and interacted
little. In contrast, languages with many common nodes, e.g., Norwegian and Swedish,
suggest that the language groups separated late or interacted regularly. Following Fearon
(2003), it has become common practice to calculate linguistic distance between groups as
a function of the number of common nodes of their languages and to use the linguistic
distance between groups as a proxy for their cultural distance more broadly defined. We
follow Putterman and Weil (2010, Appendix C) in defining the ethnic distance between
ethnic groups g and h as
γg,h := 1−
√
2η˜g,h/(ηg + ηh),
where ηi is the number of nodes of language i ∈ {g, h} and η˜g,h the number of common
nodes.26
Using mass distribution µ, spatial distribution λ, and ethnic distribution γ, we derive
our indices of ethnic geography for 161 countries with a land surface area of more than
5,000 km2 and a current population of more than 250,000.27
25In the absence of this normalization, the indices of ethnic segregation and spatial dispersion would
tend to increase in a country’s area. Notice, however, that this normalization does not affect our indices
of generalized ethnic fractionalization and ethno-spatial alignment. We show in Online Appendix G that
our results, in particular the positive effects of ethno-spatial alignment, are robust to using absolute
spatial distances in the computation of our indices.
26Fearon (2003) proposes a slightly different formula. We show in Online Appendix G that our results
are robust to using this formula.
27See Online Appendix C for a list of the 161 countries for which we provide our indices of ethnic
geography. Besides small countries, we also exclude Austria, because the homelands in the WMLS map
cover only a small portion of the area, and Serbia, because of the many changes to its borders.
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3.2 A first look at our indices
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for our indices of ethnic geography, and Figure
4 provides scatter plots illustrating the empirical relation between our index of ethnic
segregation and its three components.
Add Table 1 and Figure 4 around here
The twelve most ethnically segregated countries according to our index of ethnic seg-
regation are (in decreasing order of segregation) Papua New Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon,
India, Laos, Belize, Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, East Timor, Chad, Bolivia and Liberia.
The two scatter plots in the top row of Figure 4 show positive correlations between ethnic
segregation, on the one hand, and spatial dispersion or ethnic fractionalization, on the
other hand. They suggest that Cameroon (CMR) and, in particular, Equatorial Guinea
(GNQ) are among the most ethnically segregated countries mainly because they are highly
spatially dispersed, while Papua New Guinea (PNG), Chad (TCD) and Bolivia (BOL) are
among the most ethnically segregated countries mainly because they are highly ethnically
fractionalized.
These two scatter plots also illustrate that neither high ethnic fractionalization, nor
high spatial dispersion is sufficient for high ethnic segregation. Good examples are Spain
(ESP) and Suriname (SUR): Spain has high spatial dispersion, as its major metropolitan
areas are quite far from one another. It has also low generalized ethnic fractionalization,
as most people speak Spanish or a closely related language (like Catalan or Galician,
but unlike Basque). As a result, its ethnic segregation is relatively low despite the high
spatial dispersion. Suriname is a country with high linguistic distances between various
ethnic groups and, therefore, high generalized ethnic fractionalization. But it has also low
spatial dispersion with most people living in the capital city or nearby, such that ethnic
segregation is relatively low nevertheless.
The scatter plot on the bottom left of Figure 4 shows the relation between our index of
ethnic segregation and the alignment between ethnic and spatial distances. It documents
an empirically negative relation between ethnic segregation and ethno-spatial alignment.
We have seen in Proposition 1 in Section 2 that, all else being equal, segregation increases
with ethno-spatial alignment. This scatter plot now shows that, all else not being equal,
more aligned countries tend to be less ethnically segregated. The scatter plot on the
bottom right of Figure 4 shows that, as we would expect, the relation between ethnic
segregation and ethno-spatial alignment becomes positive once we partial out benchmark
segregation (which corresponds to F ×D).
Norway is the country with the highest ethno-spatial alignment. Most people speak
Norwegian, which is a language from the Indo-European language family, and live rel-
atively close to one another in the South of the country (e.g., around Bergen or Oslo).
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There are however some small language groups that speak Kven Finnish and Sami. Like
Finnish, these languages belong to the Uralic language family. Moreover, the homelands
of these language groups are in the far North of Norway. These people are therefore
both linguistically and spatially very far from the Norwegian speakers in the South, such
that the linguistic distance of a pair of individuals is a very good predictor of the spatial
distance, and vice versa.
Interestingly, there are also countries where alignment is less than one, implying that
the ethnic distance between spatially distant pairs of individuals tends to be smaller
than the ethnic distance between spatially close pairs of individuals. One example is
Turkmenistan, where the Turkmen are the largest language group. Moreover, there are
three minority groups, speaking Balochi, Kurdish, and Uzbek. Balochi and Kurdish
belong to the Indo-European language family, while Turkmen and Uzbek belong to the
Altaic language family. Because the homelands of the two Indo-European languages are
in fairly central and densely populated areas, pairs of linguistically diverse individuals
live on average closer to one another than pairs of individuals speaking the same or very
similar languages.
Of course, Norway and Turkmenistan differ in many dimensions. Let us therefore look
at Benin and Togo, which differ in their ethno-spatial alignment, but are similar along
many other dimensions. They are neighboring countries located in West Africa, with
comparable climatic, geographic and demographic characteristics. Moreover, they were
both French colonies after WWI, became independent in 1960, and started their post-
colonial history in tumultuous ways that culminated in coups by French-trained military
figures: Mathieu Ke´re´kou in Benin and Gnassingbe´ Eyede´ma in Togo (Meredith, 2005).
These autocrats both managed to stay in power for many years. Benin and Togo are also
comparable in terms of generalized ethnic fractionalization (between the median and the
third quartile of our sample) and spatial dispersion (above the third quartile). Ethno-
spatial alignment is however considerably higher in Benin (1.35, which is above the third
quartile) than in Togo (1.11, which is below the median). Figure 3 shows the different
ethnic homelands and the main language groups to which these ethnic homelands belong
to. Ethno-spatial alignment is relatively high in Benin as there is a relatively clear divide
between Kwa speaking groups in the south, Defoid speaking groups in the center, Gur
speaking groups in the north, and some smaller groups speaking very different languages
in the north east. As a result of this divide, linguistically distant individuals tended to live
far apart from one another. In contrast, ethno-spatial alignment is relatively low in Togo,
mainly because there are Gur and Kwa speaking groups in the country’s south, its center
and its north. As a result of these large and widespread language groups, linguistically
distant individuals often lived relatively close to one another.
Finally, in Figure 5, we compare our spatial index of ethnic segregation to the a-spatial
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index of ethnic segregation by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Add Figure 5 around here
The correlation between the two indices is relatively high (0.621), but far from perfect.28
This latter finding is not surprising given the conceptual differences between the two
indices as well as the reliance on different data in the computation of the indices. The
use of data from different sources is by itself a consequence of the conceptual differences:
our spatial index requires data on ethnic and spatial distances, while a-spatial indices are
based on the population shares of different ethnolinguistic groups in different subnational
units.
3.3 Empirical approach
In a next step, we use our indices of ethnic geography to see whether they are helpful
in predicting and understanding differences in the quality of government and economic
outcomes across countries. The use of cross-country regressions is common in the litera-
ture on the effects of ethnic heterogeneity, as is the caveat that the estimated coefficients
may not necessarily represent causal effects despite efforts to reduce the risks of omitted
variable bias and reverse causality.
In most specifications, we use continent fixed effects, thereby restricting our attention
to variation within continents. To further address omitted variable bias, we control for
variables that are known determinants of ethnic heterogeneity or ethnic geography, and
may have direct effects on current economic and institutional outcomes. In particular,
we focus on four sets of additional control variables, related to the countries’ climate,
terrain and history. First, we add temperature, precipitation and absolute latitude to
control for climate. Nettle (1998) argues that the duration of the growing season is a key
determinant of the number of ethnic groups in a territory, and calculates this duration
based on temperature and precipitation. In addition, climate is known to have more direct
effects on economic outcomes as well (e.g., Dell et al., 2012).
Second, we control for terrain ruggedness and its interaction with a dummy variable
for Africa as well the mean and standard deviation of elevation and soil suitability for
agriculture. Nunn and Puga (2012) argue that rugged terrain has generally negative effects
on economic development, but positive effects in Africa, where rugged terrain offered
protection against slave raiders. Nunn (2008) further argues that the slave trade promoted
ethnic and political fragmentation and had negative effects on economic development.
Michalopoulos (2012) shows that geographic variability, which he proxies by the mean
28Online Appendix D (Table D.1) reports correlation coefficients between our four indices and various
alternative indices of ethnic diversity. Notice the low correlation between ethno-spatial alignment and all
other indices.
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and standard deviation of elevation and soil suitability, is a key determinant of ethnic
diversity across and within countries. At the same time, land productivity is likely to
have direct economic effects as well.
Third, turning to historical variables, we control for the time elapsed since the agri-
cultural transition, the migratory distance to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and its squared
term, and dummy variables indicating the former colonizer (if any). Ahlerup and Olsson
(2012) argue that the agricultural transition had strong effects on population density and
ethnic heterogeneity; and the biological and geographical factors that led to the early
emergence of sedentary agriculture may well have shaped economic development. Migra-
tory distance from the cradle of humankind in East Africa is a predictor for the duration
of human settlement. Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) argue that ethnic diversity increases
with this duration. In addition, Ashraf and Galor (2013) show that genetic diversity
is a decreasing function of the migratory distance from East Africa, and that economic
development is a hump-shaped function of genetic diversity.
Fourth, we control for dummy variables indicating the former European colonizer (if
any), as there is considerable evidence that the random drawing of borders and divide-and-
rule strategies by the colonial powers shaped ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic geography,
and had long-term effects on economic and political outcomes (e.g., Alesina et al., 2011,
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016).29
Our choice to base the indices on a map of traditional homelands should reduce (but
not eliminate) the risk of reverse causality. We further tackle two related concerns. The
first is that our indices of ethnic geography are based on current population density
data. We therefore present additional results for indices based on the assumption that
the (historical) population of any given country was uniformly distributed across all areas
that are potentially suitable for agriculture.
The second concern is that, for some settler colonies, the WLMS map does not indi-
cate the traditional homeland of some displaced native language groups, but their new
territory. We therefore present specifications in which we exclude 26 settler colonies, de-
fined as countries where more than 10 percent of the year 2000 population have ancestors
from former European colonial powers according to Putterman and Weil’s (2010) world
migration matrix.
29See Online Appendix E for more information about the control variables. We take many of the control
variables from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Following them and many others, we exclude from our sample
the relatively young countries Montenegro and South Sudan as well as Palestine and Taiwan, which are
not UN member states, leaving us with a sample of 157 countries with a land surface area of more than
5,000 km2 and a current population of more than 250,000.
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3.4 Cross-country evidence
3.4.1 Ethnic geography and the rule of law
Inspired by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), we first look at the rule of law as a measure
of the quality of government. This measure is provided by the World Bank Governance
Indicators. By construction, it has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. In our
sample, its 2010 value has a mean of -0.203 and a standard deviation of 0.988. Table
2 shows our results. The columns differ in the set of control variables used. The top
panel presents estimates using our index of ethnic segregation. The panel in the middle
disaggregates this index into ethno-spatial alignment and benchmark segregation, and the
bottom panel replaces it with all three components: ethno-spatial alignment, generalized
ethnic fractionalization, and spatial dispersion.
Table 2 around here
We see in column (1) that the rule of law is negatively associated with our index
of ethnic segregation in the absence of control variables. This negative association is
consistent with the findings by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). When disaggregating
this index into ethno-spatial alignment and benchmark segregation, we find a negative
relation between benchmark segregation and the rule of law. It is this negative relation
that drives the negative relation between our segregation index and the rule of law. In
contrast, ethno-spatial alignment is positively associated with the rule of law. This latter
result is novel, as is the concept of ethno-spatial alignment itself. Hence, given the level
of benchmark segregation, a country has a better rule of law if individuals from very
different groups live far apart from one another. Importantly, conditioning on benchmark
segregation is akin to say that a country has a better rule of law if individuals from very
different groups live far from one another, relative to where they would have lived, had
all groups been represented in each location with population shares equal to their country
ones.
When decomposing our segregation index into its three components, the coefficient
estimates on ethno-spatial alignment remain almost unchanged. Further, we find – con-
sistent with the previous literature (e.g., Alesina et al., 2003) – that the rule of law
is negatively associated with fractionalization. The high correlation between fraction-
alization and segregation (see Figure 4) implies that this negative association between
fractionalization and the rule of law is the main reason for the negative association be-
tween (benchmark) segregation and the rule of law. In contrast, we find no statistically
significant association between spatial dispersion and the rule of law.
In column (2), we add continent fixed effects. The associations of the rule of law
with segregation (in the top panel) and fractionalization (in the bottom panel) remain
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negative, but their magnitude drops by around 50 percent. In contrast, the association
with alignment changes little (in the middle and the bottom panel). The point estimates
suggest that an increase of alignment by one standard deviation is associated with an
increase in the rule of law by 20–22 percent of a standard deviation.
In columns (3)–(6), we add the four sets of additional control variables discussed
above. We see that the association between fractionalization and the rule of law varies
quite strongly with the set of control variables, while the association between ethno-spatial
alignment and the rule of law is relatively stable in magnitude and remains statistically
significant in all these specifications.30
In column (7), we use our indices computed based on the assumption of equal popula-
tion across habitable areas. The coefficient estimate on ethno-spatial alignment becomes
even slightly higher, but – not surprisingly – less precisely estimated.
In column (8), we exclude the 26 former colonies where more than 10 percent of
the current population has ancestors from former European colonial powers according
to Putterman and Weil’s (2010) world migration matrix.31 The coefficient estimate on
ethno-spatial alignment drops slightly, but remains broadly similar as in the full sample.
Hence, our results are not driven by former colonies where many Europeans settled and
where native groups may have been displaced. We conclude that high alignment between
ethnic and spatial distances goes hand-in-hand with a high quality of government.
3.4.2 Ethnic geography and income
We now look at the association between ethnic geography and income, measured by the
log of expenditure-side real GDP per capita in USD in 2010 from the Penn World Tables
9.0. Table 3, which shows the results, is organized in the same way as the previous table.
Table 3 around here
The results are similar as well. Ethnic segregation is negatively associated with income,
but this association is imprecisely estimated in many specifications. We find a similar
pattern for generalized ethnic fractionalization when we decompose segregation into its
three components. Moreover, the association between spatial dispersion and income is
not statistically significant (with the exception of column (7)). The association between
ethno-spatial alignment and income is however positive and statistically significant in all
specifications. The point estimates in the middle and the bottom panel of column (2)
suggest that an increase in alignment by one standard deviation is associated with an
30When adding all 24 control variables jointly, the coefficient estimate on ethno-spatial alignment
becomes 0.35 (with a p-value of 0.055) in the bottom-panel specification.
31These 26 former colonies are 20 Latin American countries, “Neo-Europe” (i.e., Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the United States) plus Namibia and South Africa. In Online Appendix G, we present
additional robustness tests in which we exclude each continent individually or just “Neo-Europe.”
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increase in income by 21–24 percent.
Hence, high alignment between ethnic and spatial distances goes hand-in-hand with
high quality of government as well as high incomes today. This pattern also holds true
when comparing Benin and Togo. Remember that these neighboring countries are similar
along many dimensions, but ethno-spatial alignment is higher in Benin. Our data show
that Benin indeed does better in terms of quality of government (−0.70 vs −0.91) and
income per capita (USD 1,728 vs USD 1,214).32
3.4.3 Ethnic geography and trust
These strong associations raise the question about possible mechanisms linking tradi-
tional ethno-spatial alignment with current quality of government and current incomes.
The within-country studies by Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002), Miguel and Gugerty
(2005), and Algan et al. (2016) document that high local ethnic diversity leads to or is
at least associated with low social capital and lack of trust. High ethno-spatial align-
ment implies that ethnic diversity tends to be low in most locations (conditional on the
level of ethnic fractionalization). As a result, trust may be higher in countries with high
ethno-spatial alignment.
We use generalized trust from the World Values Surveys in the 1981–2008 time period
(taken from Ashraf and Galor, 2013) to look at the role of trust. Generalized trust is
measured as the fraction of people answering “most people can be trusted” (as opposed
to “can’t be too careful”) when asked the standard trust question (see Online Appendix
E for details). We have coverage for 77 countries, which implies a drop in sample size
by around 50 percent. Table 4 presents the associations between our indices of historical
ethnic geography and trust.
Table 4 around here
Ethno-spatial alignment is indeed positively associated with generalized trust in all
specifications. The point estimates in the middle and the bottom panel of column (2)
suggest that an increase in alignment by one standard deviation is associated with an
increase in trust by 34–40 percent of a standard deviation. In contrast, ethnic segregation,
benchmark segregation, ethnic fractionalization and spatial dispersion are all unrelated
to trust (with changes in signs across columns and high p-values throughout).
In Online Appendix F (Table F.1), we provide further evidence for the possibility
that trust could be a mechanism linking ethno-spatial alignment to a high quality of
government and high incomes. There, we show that the associations between ethno-spatial
alignment, on the one hand, and the quality of government and income, on the other hand,
become considerably weaker once we control for trust. These findings are consistent with
the notion that more aligned countries might be performing better because of higher trust.
32The data on trust, introduced in Section 4.3, is missing for Benin and Togo.
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3.4.4 Robustness
We present various robustness tests in Online Appendix G. Tables G.1–G.3 show that our
results are robust to the exclusion of individual continents, “Neo-Europe” (i.e., Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States), all ethnically homogenous countries, or
outliers. Table G.4 shows that our results are robust to the use of alternative measures
of governance and income. Table G.5 shows that our results are robust to computing
our indices based on alternative measures of ethnic and spatial distances, e.g., ethnic
distances computed based on Fearon’s (2003) formula or absolute spatial distances. Table
G.6 shows that our results for ethno-spatial alignment are not an artifact of non-linear
effects of ethnic fractionalization and spatial dispersion. Table G.7 shows that the use of
weighted least squares leads to very similar results, implying that our main results are not
just driven by small countries. Table G.8 presents results using poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML). This robustness test is of particular interest as ethnic segregation is
equal to the product of its three components (see Proposition 1). It is reassuring that the
PPML estimates suggest the same general pattern, in particular sizeable positive effects
of alignment on the quality of government, income and trust.
Furthermore, in Online Appendix H (Tables H.1–H.3), we report various specifications
that include alternative indices of ethnic diversity or ethnic geography as additional right-
hand side variables. The associations of ethno-spatial alignment with the rule of law,
income and trust remain positive and statistically significant in all specifications.
4 Conclusions
To better understand the role of ethnic geography and to mitigate well-known problems of
a-spatial segregation measures, we have developed a new segregation index that is based
on ethnic distances between groups and spatial distances between locations rather than
categorical data on ethnic groups and administrative units. The decomposition of our
segregation index reveals that it corresponds to the product of generalized ethnic frac-
tionalization, spatial dispersion, and the alignment between ethnic and spatial distances.
This ethno-spatial alignment is a novel concept that captures, broadly speaking, whether
ethnically different individuals tend to live far from each other, relative to the situation
where all groups appeared in each location with population shares equal to their country
ones.
We have computed these indices using linguistic trees as well as maps of traditional
ethnic homelands and spatially disaggregated population data. Using these indices in
cross-country regressions suggests, among other things, that countries with higher ethno-
spatial alignment tend to be better governed, richer, and more trusting.
We expect our indices to become useful in future work on the role of ethnic geography
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in shaping economic, political and social outcomes across countries. However, we also
hope to speak to the rapidly growing literature that uses ethnic homelands (or grid cells)
as units of analysis to achieve convincing identification strategies. To this literature, we
would like to convey the message that local economic, political or social outcomes in any
given ethnic homeland may well depend on the broader ethnic geography of the area or
country in which this homeland is located.
Of course, the indices we have developed can also be applied to measure the ethnic
geography of cities. For example, one could use our segregation index instead of a-spatial
measures to compare segregation across US metropolitan areas or within metropolitan
areas over time. Given that our indices allow for non-categorical ethnicity data, they may
be even more attractive in studying the ethnic geography of emerging African mega-cities,
where there is typically great variability in ethnic distances across pairs of individuals.
Finally, we would like to stress that our theoretical framework is not specific to the
ethnic dimension. Instead of categorizing individuals by ethnic groups and measuring
linguistic distances, future research could focus on other social or socio-economic cleavages
that are believed to be salient in a particular setting.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: It is easy to verify that our segregation index (2) belongs to
class (1) and satisfies Axioms 1-4. Let us show that, if an index belongs to class (1) and
satisfies Axioms 1-4, then it must take the form (2) up to a positive scalar multiplication.
Take any index from class (1) and let a, b > 0 be any scalars, where a is spatial distance
and b is ethnic distance in what follows. By Axiom 1, for  > 0 arbitrarily small,
pi(a, b) + pi(0, b) + pi(a, 0) < 2pi(a, b− ).
Letting a→ 0, by continuity of pi and pi(0, 0) = 0, we obtain at the limit
pi(0, b) ≤ pi(0, b− ).
Then, since pi is non-decreasing, pi(0, b) must be constant in b; and by pi(0, 0) = 0 we must
have
pi(0, b) = 0 for all b ≥ 0. (7)
Similarly, by Axiom 2, for  > 0 arbitrarily small,
pi(a, b) + pi(0, b) + pi(a, 0) < 2pi(a− , b),
so that letting b→ 0 by the same arguments we obtain
pi(a, 0) = 0 for all a ≥ 0. (8)
Keeping our interpretation of a as spatial distance and b as ethnic distance, let c > 0 be
any scalar that represents another spatial distance in the following. By Axiom 3, for all
 ∈ (0, b)
pi(a, b) + pi(c, b) < pi(a, b+ ) + pi(c, b− ) if c < a,
pi(a, b) + pi(c, b) > pi(a, b+ ) + pi(c, b− ) if c > a,
hence by continuity of pi
pi(a, b) + pi(c, b) = pi(a, b+ ) + pi(c, b− ) if c = a.
Rearranging terms this leads to
pi(a, b) =
pi(a, b+ ) + pi(a, b− )
2
for all  ∈ (0, b),
27
hence pi must be linear in the second argument. Jointly with (7) and (8), this implies
pi(a, b) = φ(a)b for all a, b ≥ 0, where φ : [0, 1] → R+ is some continuous non-decreasing
function that satisfies φ(0) = 0. Similarly, by Axiom 4 (interpreting a as spatial distance,
b as ethnic distance and c as another ethnic distance), for all  ∈ (0, b)
pi(b, a) + pi(b, c) = pi(b+ , a) + pi(b− , c) if c = a,
hence pi must also be linear in the first argument. It follows that φ(a) = ka for some
k > 0, and we obtain pi(a, b) = kab for all a, b ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1: It is straightforward that, if F (µ, γ) = 0 or D(µ, λ) = 0,
we must have S(µ, λ, γ) = 0. To see this, note that F (µ, γ) = 0 implies γg,h = 0 for all
g, h ∈ G with µg, µh > 0. Similarly, D(µ, λ) = 0 implies λp,q = 0 for all p, q ∈ T with
µp, µq > 0. Then, if F (µ, γ) = 0 or D(µ, λ) = 0, there is either zero spatial distance or
zero ethnic distance between each pair of individuals, which implies S(µ, λ, γ) = 0 by the
multiplicative form of pi.
We now show that, if F (µ, γ) > 0 and D(µ, λ) > 0, we must have
S(µ, λ, γ) = F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ)A(µ, λ, γ).
By the definition of A(µ, λ, γ), this is true if and only if
S(µ, λ, γ) = F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ), (9)
where the uniform mass distribution µ corresponding to µ is such that (i) µg = µg and
µp = µp for all g ∈ G and p ∈ T ; and (ii) µgp/µp = µg for all g ∈ G and p ∈ T . Combining
the definition of our index with (ii) we obtain
S(µ, λ, γ) =
∑
(p,q)∈T 2
∑
(g,h)∈G2
(
µpµ
g
) (
µqµ
h
)
λp,qγ
g,h
=
 ∑
(p,q)∈T 2
µpµqλp,q
 ∑
(g,h)∈G2
µgµhγg,h
 ,
which together with (i) implies (9). 
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Figures and Tables
(a) Importance of spatial distances
(b) Importance of ethnic distances
(c) Importance of alignment
Figure 1: Illustration of our segregation measure
Notes: The two diagrams of each sub-figure depict two distributions of ethnic groups in space. Each tone
of gray indicates a different ethnic group, and ethnic distances between groups are given by differences
in tones of gray. Spatial locations are on the horizontal axis, which also measures spatial distances, while
the vertical axis measures the population mass at each location.
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(µ, λ, γ) (µ˜, λ, γ˜)
(a) Distributions of Axiom 1.
(µ, λ, γ) (µ˜, λ˜, γ)
(b) Distributions of Axiom 2.
(µ, λ, γ) (µ, λ, γ˜)
(c) Distributions of Axiom 3.
(µ, λ, γ) (µ, λ˜, γ)
(d) Distributions of Axiom 4.
Figure 2: Illustration of the distributions of the axiomatization
Notes: The two diagrams of each sub-figure depict two distributions of ethnic groups in space. Each tone
of gray indicates a different ethnic group, and ethnic distances between groups are given by differences
in tones of gray. Spatial locations are on the horizontal axis, which also measures spatial distances, while
the vertical axis measures the population mass at each location.
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Figure 3: Ethnographic maps and population data for Togo and Benin
Notes: Maps of Togo (left) and Benin (right) showing the traditional homelands of language groups
according to WLMS and our grid cells. Each grid cell constitutes a different location in the compu-
tation of our indices, each color indicates that the corresponding grid cell belongs to the traditional
homeland of a certain language group (with the relevant language groups given in the legend), and
the brightness of this color indicates the current population (also given in the legend). The legend
entries Gur/Kwa and Gur/Defoid indicate the traditional homelands of multiple language groups,
some speaking a Gur language and some a Kwa or Defoid language. WLMS indicates no traditional
homelands in the white areas.
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Figure 4: Scatter plots illustrating the index of ethnic segregation and its components
AFG
AGO
ALB
ARE
ARG
ARM
AUS
AZE
BDI
BEL
BEN
BFA
BGD
BGR
BHS BIH
BLR
BLZ
BOL
BRA
BRN
BTN
BWACAF CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CIV
CMR
COD
COG
COL
CRI
CUB
CYP
CZEDEU
DJI
NKDOM
DZA
ECU
EGY
ERI
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN
FRAGAB
GBR
GEOGHA
GIN
GMB
GNB
GNQ
GRC
GTM
GUY
HND
HRVHTIHUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
IRQ
ISL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JOR JPN
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
KORKWT
LAO
LBN
LBR
LBY
LKA
LSOLT
LVA
MAR
MDA
MDG
MEX
MKD
MLI
MMR
MNE
MNG
MOZ
MRT
MWI
MYS
NAM
NER
NGA
NIC NLD
NOR
NPL
NZLOMN
PAKPAN
PER
PHL
PNG
P LPRT
PRY
PSEQAT
ROU
RUS
RWA
SAU
SDN
SEN
SLB
SLE
SLV
OM
SSD
S R
SVK
SVNSWE S Z
SYR
TCD
TGO
THA
TJK
TKM
TLS
TTOTUN
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
UKR
URY
USA
UZB
VEN
VNM
YEM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
S
eg
re
ga
tio
n
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
Dispersion
Slope coefficient=0.273, p-value=0.001, R-squared=0.066
AFG
AGO
ALB
ARE
ARG
ARM
AUS
AZE
BDI
BEL
BEN
BFA
BGD
BGR
HSIH
BLR
BLZ
BOL
BRA
BRN
BTN
BWACAFCAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CIV
CMR
COD
COG
COL
CRI
CUB
CYP
CZEDEU
DJI
NKOM
DZA
ECU
EGY
ERI
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN
FRAG B
GBR
GEOGHA
GIN
GMB
GNB
GNQ
GRC
GTM
GUY
HND
H VHTHUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
IRQ
ISL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JORJPN
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
K RKWT
LAO
LBN
LBR
LBY
LKA
SOTU
LVA
MAR
MDA
MDG
MEX
MKD
MLI
MMR
MNE
MNG
MOZ
MRT
MWI
YS
NAM
NER
NGA
NICNLD
NOR
NPL
NZLO N
PAK PAN
PER
PHL
PNG
P LT
PRY
P EQA
ROU
RUS
RWA
SAU
SDN
SEN
SLB
SLE
SL
SOM
SSD
SUR
SVK
S NS Z
SYR
TCD
TGO
THA
TJK
TKM
TLS
TTOT
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
UKR
U
USA
UZB
VEN
VNM
YE
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
S
eg
re
ga
tio
n
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Fractionalization
Slope coefficient=0.451, p-value=0.000, R-squared=0.888
AFG
AGO
ALB
ARE
ARG
ARM
AUS
AZE
BDI
BEL
BEN
FA
BGD
BGR
HSBIH
BLR
BLZ
BOL
BRA
BRN
BTN
BWACAFCAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CIV
CMR
COD
COG
COL
CRI
CUB
CYP
CZED U
DJI
NKDOM
DZA
ECU
EGY
ERI
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN
FRAGAB
GBR
GEO GHA
GIN
GMB
GNB
GNQ
GRC
GTM
GUY
HND
HRVHT HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
IRQ
ISL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JOR JPN
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
KOR KWT
LAO
LBN
LBR
LBY
LKA
LSOTU
LVA
MAR
MDA
MDG
MEX
MKD
MLI
MMR
MNE
MNG
MOZ
MRT
MWI
YS
NAM
NER
NGA
NICNLD
NOR
NPL
NZL OMN
PAKPAN
PER
PHL
PNG
POLPRT
PRY
PSEQAT
ROU
RUS
RWA
SAU
SDN
SEN
SLB
SLE
SL
SOM
SSD
SUR
SVK
S N SWEZ
SYR
TCD
TGO
THA
TJK
TKM
TLS
TTOTUN
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
KR
U Y
USA
UZB
VEN
VNM
YEM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
S
eg
re
ga
tio
n
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Alignment
Slope coefficient=-0.042, p-value=0.029, R-squared=0.030
AFG
AGO
ALB
ARE
ARG
ARM
AUS
AZE
BDI
BEL
BEN
FABGD
BGRHSBIH
BLR
BLZ
BOL
BRA
BRN
BTN
BWA
CAF
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CIV
CMR
COD
COG
COL
CRI
CUB
CYP
CZED U
DJI
NKDO
DZA
ECU
EGY
ERI
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN
FRA
GAB GBR
GEO
GHA
GIN
GMB
GNB
GNQ
GRC
GTM
GUY
HND
HRVHT UN
IDN
IND
I L
IRN
IRQ
ISL ISRITAJAMJOR
JPNKAZKEN
KGZ
KHM
KOR
KWT
LAO
LBN
LBR
LBYLKALSOTU
LVAMAR
MDA
MDGMEX
MKD
M IMM
MNE
MNG
O
MRT
MWI
MYS
NAM
NER
GA
NIC
NLD NOR
NPL
NZL
OMN
PAK
P N
P R
PHL
PNGPOLP T
PRY
P EQATROU
RUS
RWA S U
SDN
SE
LB
SLE
SLSOM SSD
SUR
SV
S N SWE
Z
SYR
TCD
TGO
THA
TJK
TKM
TLS
TTOTUN
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
UKRU Y
USA
UZB
VE
VNM
YEMZAF
ZMB
ZWE
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
S
eg
re
ga
tio
n 
| F
D
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
(Alignment | FD)
Slope coefficient=0.019, p-value=0.000, R-squared=0.241
Notes: Scatter plots showing the associations between the index of ethnic segregation S and its three
components: spatial dispersion (D, top left), generalized ethnic fractionalization (F, top right) and
alignment (A, bottom left). Additional scatter plot showing the association between S and A after
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Figure 5: Scatter plot comparing indices of ethnic segregation
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Table 1: Summary statistics for our indices of ethnic geography
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Segregation 161 0.099 0.093 0 0.366
Alignment 161 1.274 0.383 0.801 3.176
Benchmark Seg. 161 0.084 0.081 0 0.322
Fractionalization 161 0.210 0.195 0 0.748
Dispersion 161 0.395 0.088 0.156 0.669
Table 2: Ethnic geography and the rule of law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Segregation -3.93*** -2.08*** -1.39* -1.52* -1.93*** -2.14*** -1.24** -2.13***
(0.69) (0.66) (0.71) (0.85) (0.70) (0.61) (0.56) (0.70)
R2 0.14 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.46
Alignment 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.52** 0.59*** 0.50*** 0.65* 0.50***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.37) (0.18)
Benchmark Seg. -3.90*** -1.95** -1.26 -1.29 -1.69** -2.07*** -1.30 -2.08**
(0.78) (0.77) (0.81) (0.96) (0.79) (0.70) (0.80) (0.81)
R2 0.20 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.50
Alignment 0.62*** 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.52** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.64* 0.41**
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.37) (0.18)
Fractionalization -1.63*** -0.81** -0.53 -0.65 -0.74** -0.83** -0.65* -0.83**
(0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.42) (0.35) (0.32) (0.39) (0.37)
Dispersion -0.22 -0.90 -0.76 0.47 -0.42 -0.82 -0.36 -1.33
(0.85) (0.85) (0.89) (1.04) (1.03) (0.83) (0.80) (0.87)
R2 0.20 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.42 0.51
Continent FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls No No Climate Terrain Deep hist. Col. hist. No No
Population data Current Current Current Current Current Current Land cov. Current
Restricted sample No No No No No No No Yes
Countries 157 157 156 147 150 157 154 131
Notes: Dependent variable is rule of law in 2010 from the World Bank Governance Indicators. Each
column presents three OLS regressions. In the upper panel the main explanatory variable is eth-
nic segregation, in the middle panel these are ethno-spatial alignment and benchmark segregation,
and in the lower panel these are ethno-spatial alignment, generalized ethnic fractionalization and
spatial dispersion. These indices are explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. They are computed using
current population density data in columns (1)–(6) and (8), and global land cover data on habit-
able areas in column (7). Columns (2)–(8) include continent fixed effects. Additional controls are
temperature, precipitation and absolute latitude in column (3); terrain ruggedness, its interaction
with a dummy variable for Africa, and averages and standard deviations of elevation and land suit-
ability for agriculture in column (4); migratory distance from Addis Ababa, its square term, and
the time elapsed since the agricultural transition in column (5); and dummy variables for former
British/French/Spanish/other colonies in column (6). Online Appendix E contains more information
on dependent and control variables. Settler colonies, defined as former colonies where more than 10
percent of the current population has ancestors from former European colonial powers, according to
Putterman and Weil’s (2010) world migration matrix, are excluded in column (8). Robust standard
errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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Table 3: Ethnic geography and income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Segregation -5.19*** -1.63* -0.86 -0.72 -2.06** -1.85** -1.10* -2.42**
(1.00) (0.98) (0.99) (1.13) (0.96) (0.93) (0.65) (1.16)
R2 0.14 0.52 0.55 0.61 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55
Alignment 0.69*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.37** 0.55*** 0.50*** 0.85*** 0.57***
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.32) (0.17)
Benchmark Seg. -5.56*** -1.84* -1.07 -0.99 -2.09* -2.08** -1.25 -2.78**
(1.15) (1.09) (1.09) (1.24) (1.09) (1.04) (0.80) (1.27)
R2 0.21 0.55 0.58 0.62 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.58
Alignment 0.61*** 0.49** 0.52*** 0.38* 0.44** 0.44** 0.93*** 0.47**
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.31) (0.22)
Fractionalization -2.19*** -0.78* -0.53 -0.72 -0.80* -0.80* -0.41 -1.17**
(0.46) (0.41) (0.44) (0.49) (0.43) (0.41) (0.37) (0.48)
Dispersion -1.61 -1.04 -0.43 1.68 -1.69 -1.06 -2.42*** -1.39
(1.13) (1.22) (1.20) (1.25) (1.08) (1.18) (0.91) (1.40)
R2 0.21 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.59
Continent FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls No No Climate Terrain Deep hist. Col. hist. No No
Population data Current Current Current Current Current Current Land cov. Current
Restricted sample No No No No No No No Yes
Countries 148 148 148 139 144 148 145 123
Notes: Dependent variable is log of expenditure-side real GDP per capita in 2010 from the Penn
World Tables 9.0. Each column presents three OLS regressions. In the upper panel the main ex-
planatory variable is ethnic segregation, in the middle panel these are ethno-spatial alignment and
benchmark segregation, and in the lower panel these are ethno-spatial alignment, generalized ethnic
fractionalization and spatial dispersion. These indices are explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. They are
computed using current population density data in columns (1)–(6) and (8), and global land cover
data on habitable areas in column (7). Columns (2)–(8) include continent fixed effects. Additional
controls are temperature, precipitation and absolute latitude in column (3); terrain ruggedness, its
interaction with a dummy variable for Africa, and averages and standard deviations of elevation and
land suitability for agriculture in column (4); migratory distance from Addis Ababa, its square term,
and the time elapsed since the agricultural transition in column (5); and dummy variables for former
British/French/Spanish/other colonies in column (6). Online Appendix E contains more information
on dependent and control variables. Settler colonies, defined as former colonies where more than 10
percent of the current population has ancestors from former European colonial powers, according to
Putterman and Weil’s (2010) world migration matrix, are excluded in column (8). Robust standard
errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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Table 4: Ethnic geography and trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Segregation -0.21 -0.00 0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.04
(0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.13) (0.22)
R2 0.01 0.25 0.40 0.48 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.23
Alignment 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.07** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Benchmark Seg. -0.02 0.22 0.36* 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.19
(0.23) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.25)
R2 0.15 0.38 0.48 0.53 0.45 0.40 0.28 0.39
Alignment 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.09** 0.10** 0.15*** 0.11***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Fractionalization -0.02 0.10 0.16* 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Dispersion 0.03 -0.16 -0.07 0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.12 -0.24
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22) (0.15) (0.21)
R2 0.15 0.39 0.49 0.53 0.46 0.41 0.29 0.41
Continent FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further controls No No Climate Terrain Deep hist. Col. hist. No No
Population data Current Current Current Current Current Current Land cov. Current
Restricted sample No No No No No No No Yes
Countries 77 77 77 74 76 77 77 63
Notes: Dependent variable is generalized trust from the World Value Survey in the 1981-2008 time
period (taken from Ashraf and Galor 2013). It is the fraction of people answering “most people can
be trusted” (as opposed to “can’t be too careful”) when asked the standard trust question. Each
column presents three OLS regressions. In the upper panel the main explanatory variable is eth-
nic segregation, in the middle panel these are ethno-spatial alignment and benchmark segregation,
and in the lower panel these are ethno-spatial alignment, generalized ethnic fractionalization and
spatial dispersion. These indices are explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. They are computed using
current population density data in columns (1)–(6) and (8), and global land cover data on habit-
able areas in column (7). Columns (2)–(8) include continent fixed effects. Additional controls are
temperature, precipitation and absolute latitude in column (3); terrain ruggedness, its interaction
with a dummy variable for Africa, and averages and standard deviations of elevation and land suit-
ability for agriculture in column (4); migratory distance from Addis Ababa, its square term, and
the time elapsed since the agricultural transition in column (5); and dummy variables for former
British/French/Spanish/other colonies in column (6). Online Appendix E contains more information
on dependent and control variables. Settler colonies, defined as former colonies where more than 10
percent of the current population has ancestors from former European colonial powers, according to
Putterman and Weil’s (2010) world migration matrix, are excluded in column (8). Robust standard
errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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A. Shortcomings of a-spatial segregation indices
Border dependence: Border dependence occurs due to the (implicit) assumption of a-
spatial segregation measures that the distance between two individuals is zero when they
are located in the same subnational unit, and one when located in different subnational
units. As a result, the index value of a-spatial segregation measures heavily depends on
the type of subnational units used when computing the index values. For example, it may
depend on whether provinces or districts are used when relying on administrative units,
or on the size of cells or circles when researchers construct “geometric” subnational units.
Figure A.1 illustrates the problem of border dependence: The spatial distribution of
individuals from different ethnic groups is identical in the left and the right diagram,
however there are four administrative units in the left diagram, but only two in the
right diagram. Any a-spatial segregation measure would classify the society in the left
diagram as highly segregated, because the population is ethnically homogenous in each
administrative unit, but as non-segregated in the right diagram, where the two groups’
population shares are the same in each administrative unit.
Figure A.1: Illustration of border dependence
Notes: The two diagrams depict two distributions of ethnic groups in space. Each tone of gray indicates
a different ethnic group, and ethnic distances between groups are given by differences in tones of gray.
Spatial locations are on the horizontal axis, which also measures spatial distances, while the vertical
axis measures the population mass at each location. The dotted vertical lines indicate administrative
boundaries.
To illustrate that border dependence is a real concern, we use data from the Nigeria
Development and Health Survey (DHS) 2013. This survey of more than 38,000 mothers of
childbearing age provides information on, among other things, these mothers’ self-reported
ethnicity and the geo-coordinates of cluster locations. We use these geo-coordinates to
assign each cluster (and thereby each mother) to a state and a local government area
(LGA). The DHS further groups Nigeria into 6 regions that play no administrative or
political role. Table A.1, column (1) shows that, according to the Nigeria DHS 2013, there
are 307 different ethnic groups and the population share of the largest group (Hausa) is
24 percent. We then collapse the data at the level of DHS regions, states and LGAs.
For each of these levels, we report in columns (2)–(4) the average number of groups, the
average population share of the largest group, and the number of subnational units on
which these two summary statistics are based. We see an inverse relation between the
level of spatial disaggregation and the average ethnic heterogeneity within subnational
units. As a result, any a-spatial segregation index would provide markedly different index
values for Nigeria in 2013, depending on whether DHS regions, states or LGAs were used
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as the relevant subnational units. The index value would be highest for LGAs and lowest
for DHS regions.2
Table A.1: Ethnic heterogeneity in subnational units in Nigeria
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country DHS regions States LGAs
Number of units 1 6 38 501
Average number of groups 307 98.17 28.29 5.08
Average share of largest group 0.24 0.53 0.59 0.80
Checkerboard problem: The checkerboard problem refers to the impossibility of a-
spatial segregation measures to account for the arrangements or relative positions of sub-
national units in space. It occurs due to the (implicit) assumption of a-spatial segregation
measures that the distance between two individuals is one when they are located in dif-
ferent subnational units, no matter how far apart these units are.
Figure A.2 illustrates the problem: A-spatial segregation measures classify the societies
in the left and the right diagram as equally segregated, even though the society represented
in the left diagram appears more segregated than the one in the right diagram.
Figure A.2: Illustration of the checkerboard problem
Notes: The two diagrams of each sub-figure depict two distributions of ethnic groups in space. Each tone
of gray indicates a different ethnic group, and ethnic distances between groups are given by differences
in tones of gray. Spatial locations are on the horizontal axis, which also measures spatial distances,
while the vertical axis measures the population mass at each location. The dotted vertical lines indicate
administrative boundaries.
2Alesina and Zhursavskaysa (2011) use DHS to compute ethnic segregation in various countries, in-
cluding Nigeria, where they take DHS regions as the relevant subnational units.
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B. Geometric interpretation of our segregation index
To illustrate the general properties of our segregation index and its various components,
we now provide a geometric interpretation. Suppose the population is finite, where P :=
{1, . . . ,m} is the set of individuals and m ≥ 3. For each pair of individuals i, j ∈ P ,
denote by λi,j and γ
i,j the spatial and ethnic distance between them. Let
Λ := (λ1,1, . . . , λm,m) and Γ := (γ
1,1, . . . , γm,m)
be the vectors of spatial and ethnic distances between all unordered pairs of individuals.
Then, equation (2) can be written as S(µ, λ, γ) = 4
m2
Λ · Γ, and by definition of inner
product our segregation index can be decomposed into
S(µ, λ, γ) =
4
m2
||Λ||2||Γ||2 cos[θΛ,Γ], (B.1)
where
||Λ||2 :=
1
2
∑
(i,j)∈P 2
(λi,j)
2
1/2 and ||Γ||2 :=
1
2
∑
(i,j)∈P 2
(γi,j)2
1/2
are the Euclidean norms of the two vectors Λ and Γ, and θΛ,Γ is the angle between them.
Since cos[0] = 1, our segregation index is maximized when the two vectors point in the
same direction (θΛ,Γ = 0), which means that Λ and Γ are linearly dependent, i.e., there
is some k > 0 such that λi,j = kγ
i,j for all i, j ∈ P . In this sense, S can be interpreted as
a geometric projection. To see an example, consider the two joint distributions in Figure
1(c). Clearly, by S the left distribution is more segregated than the right, as Λ and Γ
are co-directional in the left but not in the right distribution, everything else equal. This
is in line with our intuition in the Introduction. Another relevant feature of our index
is that any increase in the mean of the two vectors, or in their Euclidean norms, also
leads to higher segregation. For example, in Figure 1(b) the distribution on the left is
more segregated than that on the right as the mean ethnic distance (and the Euclidean
norm ||Γ||2) is higher, everything else being equal. Moreover, any mean-preserving spread
of the elements of each of the two vectors Λ and Γ that keeps their alignment constant
leads to higher segregation. This can be easily shown by the convexity of the (square of
the) Euclidean norms ||Λ||2 and ||Γ||2 in the spatial distance and in the ethnic distance
between each pair of individuals, respectively.
This geometric interpretation of our segregation index resembles the decomposition
in Proposition 1: The generalized social fractionalization index F and the spatial disper-
sion index D are related to the Euclidean norms of the two respective vectors, and the
alignment index A is therefore related to the cosign of the angle between the vectors of
ethnic and spatial distances. In particular, it follows from Proposition 1 and Equation
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(B.1) that A(µ, λ, γ) ≈ cos[θΛ,Γ] and F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ) ≈ 4||Λ||2||Γ||2/m2. To see this, it is
useful to write
F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ) =
(
2
m2
)2 ∑
(i,j)∈P 2
γi,j
 ∑
(i,j)∈P 2
λi,j
 ,
4||Λ||2||Γ||2/m2 =
(
2
m2
) ∑
(i,j)∈P 2
(γi,j)2
1/2 ∑
(i,j)∈P 2
(λi,j)
2
1/2 .
Note the proportionality across the two equations for each of the three elements that re-
spectively correspond to population size (m), social distances (γi,j) and spatial distances
(λi,j). Although different, F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ) and 4||Λ||2||Γ||2/m2 are closely related, which
means that A(µ, λ, γ) and the cosign of θΛ,Γ are closely related as well.
3 This relation fur-
ther justifies our interpretation of A as alignment or co-directionality of spatial and ethnic
distances. For the purpose of empirical applications, A has the advantage – compared to
the consign of θΛ,Γ – that its computation does not require data at the individual level.
Similarly, F and D are related to the Euclidean norms ||Γ||2 and ||Λ||2 and have the same
empirical advantage compared to them.
3One can show that A(µ, λ, γ) is a positively-biased proxy of cos[θΛ,Γ]. This follows from
4||Λ||2||Γ||2/m2 ≥ S(µ, λ, γ) for all µ ∈ M (as cos[θΛ,Γ] ∈ [0, 1]) and F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ) = S(µ, λ, γ), which
jointly imply 4||Λ||2||Γ||2/m2 ≥ F (µ, γ)D(µ, λ). Hence, A(µ, λ, γ) ≥ cos[θΛ,Γ].
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C. List of countries
We provide our four indices of ethnic geography (i.e., ethnic segregation, generalized
ethnic fractionalization, spatial dispersion, and ethno-spatial alignment) for the follow-
ing 161 countries with a current population of more than 250,000 and a land surface
area of more than 5,000 km2: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Ar-
menia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East
Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fin-
land, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South
Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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D. Correlations between our indices and alternative
indices
Table D.1: Correlations between our indices and alternative indices
Index (i) Source Cor(S,i) Cor(A,i) Cor(F,i) Cor(D,i) Obs.
Standard fractionalization ADEKW 0.578 -0.235 0.541 0.304 154
Standard fractionalization AZ 0.581 -0.223 0.554 0.246 91
A-spatial segregation AZ 0.621 -0.129 0.541 0.164 90
Standard fractionalization EMR 0.585 -0.216 0.569 0.115 133
Generalized fractionalization EMR 0.597 -0.081 0.631 -0.033 133
Polarization EMR 0.384 -0.049 0.441 -0.080 133
Notes: Standard fractionalization refers to the index of ethnic fractionalization based on categorical
data, whereas generalized fractionalization is based on (non-binary) ethnic distances and sometimes
called the Greenberg-Gini index. A-spatial segregation refers to the segregation index used by Alesina
and Zhuravskaya (2011), which is based on the population shares of different ethnic groups in differ-
ent subnational units rather than ethnic and spatial distances. Polarization refers to the polarization
index by Duclos et al. (2004). ADEKW stands for Alesina et al. (2003), AZ for Alesina and Zhu-
ravskaya (2011), and EMR for Esteban et al. (2012). Cor(X,i) refers to the correlation between our
index X and the index i given in the first column.
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E. Definitions of dependent and control variables
E.1. Dependent variables
E.1.1. Main dependent variables
Rule of law: This is one of six World Bank Governance Indicators (also called World-
wide Governance Indicators) for 2010. These indicators are based on several hundred
individual variables from many different organizations measuring perceptions of gover-
nance. These individual measures of governance are assigned to categories capturing key
dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model is used to construct the six
aggregate governance indicators. They are normally distributed with a mean of zero and
a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. The rule of law indicator includes
several indicators that measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effective-
ness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. This indicator
thus measures the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and
predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to
which property rights are protected.
Income (PWT): Logarithm of expenditure-side real GDP per capita in 2010 at chained
purchasing power parities (in 2011 US dollars) by Penn World Table, version 9.
Trust: Measure of generalized trust based on World Values Surveys conducted from
1981-2008. It is calculated as the fraction of total respondents who responded with “most
people can be trusted” (as opposed to “can’t be too careful”) when asked: “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people?” Variable taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
E.1.2. Additional dependent variables used in Online Appendix E
Control of corruption: This is one of six World Bank Governance Indicators for 2010.
It measures perceptions of corruption, including the frequency of bribe payments in the
business environment and the extent of political corruption.
Government effectiveness: This is one of six World Bank Governance Indicators for
2010. It measures public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence
of civil servants, and the independence of the civil service from political pressures.
Political stability: This is one of six World Bank Governance Indicators for 2010. It
measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized
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or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means.
Regulatory quality: This is one of six World Bank Governance Indicators for 2010.
It measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies and perceptions of the burdens
imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.
Voice and accountability: This is one of six World Bank Governance Indicators for
2010. It measures various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights
to indicate the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection
of governments.
Quality of government: This indicator from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) corresponds to the mean of three ICRG variables in 2010: Corruption, law and
order, and bureaucratic quality.
Corruption perception index: This index from Transparency International focuses
on perceptions of corruption in the public sector in 2010 and includes both administrative
and political corruption. We have rescaled it so that it ranges between zero and one, with
higher values implying less corruption.
Income (WDI): Logarithm of GDP per capita in 2010 based on purchasing power
parity (in constant 2011 international dollars) from the World Development Indicators.
E.1.3. Summary statistics
Table E.1: Summary statistics for our dependent variables
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Rule of law 157 -0.203 0.988 -2.448 1.977
Income (PWT, in logs) 148 9.047 1.241 6.341 11.708
Trust 77 0.277 0.141 0.038 0.664
Control of corruption 157 -0.171 0.988 -1.739 2.414
Government effectiveness 157 -0.119 0.979 -2.239 2.245
Political stability 157 0.255 0.384 0.000 1.393
Regulatory quality 157 -0.096 0.976 -2.381 1.888
Voice and accountability 157 -0.213 0.995 -2.155 1.637
Quality of government 131 0.526 0.198 0.083 1.000
Corruption perception index 154 0.385 0.205 0.110 0.930
Income (WDI, in logs) 152 9.040 1.256 6.391 11.757
9
E.2. Control variables
Absolute latitude: The absolute value of the latitude of a country’s approximate cen-
troid, as reported by the CIA’s World Factbook, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Temperature: The intertemporal average monthly temperature of a country in degrees
Celsius per month over the 1961–1990 time period, calculated using geospatial average
monthly temperature data, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Precipitation: The intertemporal average monthly precipitation of a country in mm per
month over the 1961–1990 time, calculated using geospatial average monthly precipitation
data, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Terrain roughness: Terrain Ruggedness Index by Nunn and Puga (2012), which quan-
tifies average local topographic heterogeneity by measuring elevation differences for grid
points within 30 arc-seconds.
Average and standard deviation of elevation: Variables based on geospatial ele-
vation data, taken from Michalopoulos (2012).
Average and standard deviation of land suitability: Variables based on a geospa-
tial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate
and soil suitability for cultivation, taken from Michalopoulos (2012).
Migratory distance from Addis Ababa: The great circle distance from Addis Ababa
(Ethiopia) to the country’s modern capital city along a land-restricted path forced through
one or more of five intercontinental waypoints (Cairo, Istanbul, Phnom Penh, Anadyr,
and Prince Rupert), taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Time elapsed since the agricultural transition: The number of years elapsed up
to the year 2000 CE since the majority of the population residing within a country’s
modern national borders began practicing sedentary agriculture as the primary mode of
subsistence, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Former colonizer: A variable indicating whether a country is a former British colony,
a former French colony, a former Spanish colony, the former colony of another Western
colonizer, or not a former Western colony. It is based on the classification of Western
overseas colonies in the Authoritarian Regime Dataset.
10
F. Trust as a possible mechanism
Table F.1 Ethnic geography, trust, rule of law, and income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent var. Rule of law Rule of law Income Income
Alignment 0.60*** 0.28 0.48*** 0.29*
(0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.15)
Fractionalization -0.66 -0.97 -0.50 -0.69
(0.72) (0.70) (0.65) (0.64)
Dispersion 0.10 0.60 -0.34 -0.04
(1.46) (1.27) (1.01) (0.98)
Trust 3.02*** 1.81***
(0.85) (0.62)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 77 77 77 77
R2 0.42 0.52 0.59 0.63
Notes: OLS regressions with continent fixed effects. The dependent variable is the rule of law in
2010 from the World Bank Governance Indicators in columns (1) and (2), and expenditure-side
real GDP per capita in 2010 from the Penn World Tables 9.0 in columns (3) and (4). The sample is
restricted to countries for which generalized trust from the World Value Survey in the 1981-2008 time
period is available. Online Appendix E contains more information on the dependent variables and
generalized trust. Ethno-spatial alignment, generalized ethnic fractionalization and spatial dispersion
are explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. Robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01,
0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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G. Robustness of cross-country regressions
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Table G.6: Allowing for non-linear effects of fractionalization and dispersion
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var. Rule of law Income Trust
(WBGI) (PWT) (WVS)
Alignment 0.47** 0.40** 0.10***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.03)
Fractionalization -2.89 -2.75 -0.15
(1.96) (2.04) (0.48)
Fractionalization2 0.53 -0.53 0.20
(1.65) (1.64) (0.48)
Dispersion -1.65 -11.10* -0.03
(4.39) (5.64) (0.95)
Dispersion2 -0.30 11.68 -0.29
(5.59) (7.36) (1.31)
Fractionalization 4.58 5.87 0.41
× Dispersion (4.01) (4.24) (1.10)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.45 0.58 0.40
Countries 157 148 77
Notes: OLS regressions with continent fixed effect. Dependent variables are the rule of law in 2010 by
the World Bank Governance Indicators in column (1), expenditure-side real GDP per capita in 2010
from the Penn World Tables 9.0 in column (2), and generalized trust from the World Value Survey
in the 1981-2008 time period (Ashraf and Galor 2013) in column (3). Online Appendix E contains
more information on these variables. Alignment, fractionalization and dispersion are explained in
Sections 2 and 3.1. The addition of square and interaction terms of fractionalization and dispersion
allows showing that the coefficient on alignment is not driven by some non-linearity in the effects of
fractionalization or dispersion. Robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05
and 0.1, respectively.
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Table G.7: Weight least squares (WLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent var. Rule of law (WBGI) Income (PWT) Trust (WVS)
Segregation -1.40* -1.37* -1.08 -1.06 0.16 0.15
(0.71) (0.73) (0.99) (0.98) (0.16) (0.17)
R2 0.43 0.43 0.55 0.55 0.36 0.37
Alignment 0.53*** 0.49** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03)
Benchmark Seg. -1.33 -1.28 -1.37 -1.36 0.34* 0.35*
(0.82) (0.84) (1.12) (1.10) (0.19) (0.19)
R2 0.47 0.47 0.57 0.57 0.44 0.45
Alignment 0.51*** 0.48*** 0.45** 0.42** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.03) (0.03)
Fractionalization -0.60 -0.59 -0.62 -0.63 0.15* 0.15*
(0.36) (0.37) (0.44) (0.44) (0.08) (0.09)
Dispersion -0.40 -0.22 -0.77 -0.57 -0.08 -0.07
(0.90) (0.92) (1.15) (1.11) (0.21) (0.21)
R2 0.47 0.47 0.58 0.58 0.45 0.46
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights Pop. Area Pop. Area Pop. Area
Countries 157 157 148 148 77 77
Notes: Each column presents three WLS regressions with continent fixed effects. Weights are the
log of population size in odd columns and the log of surface area in even columns, both from the
World Development Indicators. Dependent variables are the rule of law in 2010 by the World Bank
Governance Indicators in columns (1) and (2), expenditure-side real GDP per capita in 2010 from the
Penn World Tables 9.0 in columns (3) and (4), and generalized trust from the World Value Survey
in the 1981-2008 time period (Ashraf and Galor 2013) in columns (5) and (6). Online Appendix E
contains more information on dependent and control variables. Segregation, alignment, benchmark
segregation, fractionalization and dispersion are explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. Robust standard
errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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Table G.8: Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent var. QoG (ICRG) Income (PWT) Trust (WVS)
Alignment 0.20 0.31*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.48*** 0.54***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.18) (0.16)
Benchmark Seg. -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
R2 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.15
Alignment 0.23** 0.21** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.49** 0.40**
(0.11) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.19) (0.16)
Fractionalization -0.03 -0.02 -0.01* -0.01* 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02)
Dispersion 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.14
(0.13) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22)
R2 0.48 0.46 0.58 0.56 0.35 0.37
Continental dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Windsorizing F & BS No Yes No Yes No Yes
Countries 119 131 134 148 70 77
Notes: PPML regressions. Dependent variables are the quality of government by ICRG in columns
(1) and (2), expenditure-side real GDP per capita in 2010 from the Penn World Tables 9.0 in columns
(3) and (4), and generalized trust from the World Value Survey in the 1981-2008 time period (Ashraf
and Galor 2013) in columns (5) and (6). Online Appendix E contains more information on these
variables. We use the quality of government by ICRG rather than the rule of law in 2010 by the
World Bank Governance Indicators as in most other tables, because PPML requires non-negative
dependent variables. This change of the dependent variable leads to a drop in the sample size. All
regressions include continental dummy variables. Alignment, fractionalization and dispersion all enter
in logs. We thus lose all countries in which fractionalization is zero in odd columns. We add a small
constant (0.001) to fractionalization and benchmark segregation before taking logs in even columns,
which allows keeping these countries in the sample. Alignment, fractionalization and dispersion are
explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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H. Cross-country regressions including alternative in-
dices
Table H.1: Controlling for the standard fractionalization index by Alesina et al. (2003)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Rule of law Income Trust
(WBGI) (PWT) (WVS)
Segregation (HVV) -2.22*** -1.00 -0.00
(0.82) (1.25) (0.25)
Standard fractionalization (ADEKW) -0.04 -0.72 -0.03
(0.34) (0.45) (0.08)
R2 0.40 0.54 0.23
Alignment (HVV) 0.48*** 0.43** 0.10***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.04)
Generalized fractionalization (HVV) -0.97** -0.71 0.11
(0.43) (0.52) (0.13)
Dispersion (HVV) -0.80 -0.62 -0.15
(0.88) (1.23) (0.20)
Standard fractionalization (ADEKW) 0.12 -0.46 -0.02
(0.34) (0.44) (0.08)
R2 0.45 0.57 0.37
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes
Countries 153 145 75
Notes: Each column presents two OLS regressions with continent fixed effects. Dependent variables
are the rule of law in 2010 by the World Bank Governance Indicators in column (1), expenditure-side
real GDP per capita in 2010 from the Penn World Tables 9.0 in column (2), and generalized trust
from the World Value Survey in the 1981-2008 time period (Ashraf and Galor 2013) in column (3).
Segregation (HVV), alignment (HVV), generalized fractionalization (HVV) and dispersion (HVV)
are our indices explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. Standard fractionalization (ADEKW) is the index of
linguistic fractionalization based on categorical data as computed by Alesina et al. (2003). Robust
standard errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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Table H.2: Controlling for the indices of standard fractionalization and a-spatial segrega-
tion by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Rule of law Income Trust
(WBGI) (PWT) (WVS)
Segregation (HVV) 0.06 0.63 0.13
(1.04) (1.37) (0.34)
Standard fractionalization (AZ) -0.29 -0.41 0.09
(0.43) (0.50) (0.13)
Segregation (AZ) -1.11 0.05 -0.26*
(0.71) (0.74) (0.14)
R2 0.44 0.64 0.31
Alignment (HVV) 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.10**
(0.20) (0.18) (0.04)
Generalized fractionalization (HVV) 0.05 0.11 0.24
(0.49) (0.66) (0.17)
Dispersion (HVV) 0.48 1.11 -0.13
(1.49) (0.97) (0.27)
Standard fractionalization (AZ) -0.11 -0.21 0.06
(0.43) (0.50) (0.15)
Segregation (AZ) -1.16 0.08 -0.27
(0.72) (0.73) (0.18)
R2 0.52 0.68 0.46
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes
Countries 90 89 54
Notes: Each column presents two OLS regressions with continent fixed effects. Dependent variables
are the rule of law in 2010 by the World Bank Governance Indicators in column (1), expenditure-side
real GDP per capita in 2010 from the Penn World Tables 9.0 in column (2), and generalized trust
from the World Value Survey in the 1981-2008 time period (Ashraf and Galor 2013) in column (3).
Segregation (HVV), alignment (HVV), generalized fractionalization (HVV) and dispersion (HVV)
are our indices explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. Standard fractionalization (AZ) is the index of
linguistic fractionalization based on categorical data as computed by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Segregation (AZ) is the a-spatial segregation index used by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011), which
is based on the population shares of different language groups in different subnational units rather
than ethnolingustic and spatial distances. Robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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Table H.3: Controlling for the indices of standard fractionalization, generalized fraction-
alization and polarization by Esteban et al. (2012)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Rule of law Income Trust
(WBGI) (PWT) (WVS)
Segregation (HVV) -1.23 -2.51* 0.22
(1.06) (1.45) (0.27)
Standard fractionalization (EMR) -0.43 -0.51 -0.26***
(0.41) (0.48) (0.08)
Generalized fractionalization (EMR) 0.15 1.50 0.61*
(1.17) (1.58) (0.31)
Polarization (EMR) -0.81 -1.20 -1.69**
(3.01) (3.81) (0.70)
R2 0.44 0.61 0.36
Alignment (HVV) 0.60*** 0.46** 0.10***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.04)
Generalized fractionalization (HVV) -0.39 -1.17* 0.20
(0.50) (0.64) (0.13)
Dispersion (HVV) 0.08 -1.26 -0.07
(1.09) (0.99) (0.20)
Standard fractionalization (EMR) -0.29 -0.29 -0.21***
(0.38) (0.46) (0.07)
Generalized fractionalization (EMR) -0.44 1.05 0.45
(1.13) (1.54) (0.29)
Polarization (EMR) 0.91 0.36 -1.32*
(2.91) (3.69) (0.67)
R2 0.49 0.64 0.47
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes
Countries 132 129 75
Notes: Each column presents two OLS regressions with continent fixed effects. Dependent variables
are the rule of law in 2010 by the World Bank Governance Indicators in column (1), expenditure-side
real GDP per capita in 2010 from the Penn World Tables 9.0 in column (2), and generalized trust
from the World Value Survey in the 1981-2008 time period (Ashraf and Galor 2013) in column (3).
Segregation (HVV), alignment (HVV), generalized fractionalization (HVV) and dispersion (HVV)
are our indices explained in Sections 2 and 3.1. Standard fractionalization (EMR) is the index of
ethnic fractionalization based on categorical data as computed by Esteban et al. (2012). Generalized
fractionalization (EMR) is their Greenberg-Gini index, which is based on ethnic and spatial distances.
Polarization (EMR) is the polarization index by Duclos et al. (2004) as computed by Esteban et al.
(2012). Robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate p-values below 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
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